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ABSTRACT
This study examined the main territorial, political, and economic obstacles
facing the establishment of a Palestinian state. The study tried to determine if the
classical requirements of state formation can be met within the geographic and
political context of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. To accomplish this, the
study focused on the main obstacles and problems associated with the following:
1. The territorial definition and delimitation of a Palestinian state.
2. The determination of Palestinian citizenship and political representation.
3. The establishment of a viable and independent Palestinian economy.
4. The specification and execution of the functions and responsibilities of a
Palestinian state apparatus.
To provide a context for studying the political geography of a Palestinian
state, the principal geographic and political literature on the state as a politically
organized area was reviewed and summarized. The summary included general
description of the concepts of state sovereignty and factors influencing it,
political borders, nation and nationalism, state form, state functions, and state
apparatus. Two theories of state formation were also included to provide a
comparative framework for examining the Palestinian case.
The 1993 PLO-Israeli Declaration of Principals (DOP) on Palestinian interim
self-government arrangements is considered a major qualitative development in
the nature of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This thesis, thus, used the DOP and
the subsequent Cairo Agreement between the PLO and Israel as the starting point
for the analysis. The potential effects of the DOP and the Cairo Agreement on the
process of Palestinian state formation was examined. A detailed textual analysis
of the two agreements revealed their insufficiency for addressing the main
obstacles outlined by the thesis.

The way in which these problems are addressed will ultimately determine
the geopolitical outcome of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. By identifying and
classifying these problems and obstacles this thesis provides a context for
evaluating the feasibility of creating a Palestinian state. For a truly independent
Palestinian state to form, the PLO-Israeli peace process must produce an adequate
resolution to the various problems outlined in this thesis. Any future Palestinian
political entity that falls short of meeting all the essential requirements of a state
cannot be considered as such.
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CHAP1ER1
IN1RODUCTION
The Palestinian-Israeli struggle is considered one of the most complex
territorial conflicts of our modem era. Since the end of World War One, the
conflict has been a major source of strife and instability for the whole Middle East
region resulting in seven major wars that claimed the lives of thousands of people
and caused immeasurable human suffering to thousands of others in the area. The
Palestinian-Israeli conflict lies at the heart of the Arab World's enmity with the
State of Israel and all prospects of normalization between Israel and the
surrounding Arab countries depend on a just resolution of it.
The recent signing of peace accords between Israel and the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) have raised expectations for a peaceful resolution
to the conflict. The Palestinian-Israeli accords resulted in limited Palestinian
autonomy in parts of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank city of Jericho for a
transitional period of five years. A comprehensive solution to the conflict is yet
to be negotiated between the two sides and will not take effect until the end of
the five-year transitional period. However, the events of the past half century
strongly suggest that a just and durable solution will not be reached without
granting the Palestinian people the right of self-determination including the
creation of a Palestinian state.
This thesis outlines and analyzes the main problems and obstacles facing
the implementation of such a Palestinian state. Most of the previous literature on
Palestinian autonomy and statehood lacks a clear geographic dimension. In
addition, the geographic literature on the topic is far from complete, and there is a
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serious need for work that treats the issue of Palestinian autonomy and statehood
in a more comprehensive and holistic fashion. This thesis tries to remove the
ambiguity that is traditionally associated with the geographic meaning of the
different proposals for Palestinian autonomy and statehood, i.e., what they entail
territorially and geopolitically.
The geographic identification and classification of the problems and
obstacles facing Palestinian statehood will provide a more realistic picture of the
prerequisites to the creation of a Palestinian state. In this way, the thesis puts the
issue of the feasibility of a Palestinian state in its proper context. This thesis,
however, is limited in both the scope and time span of its predictions. The Middle
East is a highly dynamic region of the world; political and strategic changes in the
region could affect the process of Palestinian state formation in a radical way at
any time.
To adequately examine the political geography of any future Palestinian
political entity, it is necessary to inspect how the complex Palestinian-Israeli
conflict evolved.
Historical Background
Palestine,1 the historic region occupying the southwest corner of the
ancient Fertile Crescent, was the locus of successive settlements and conquests
by many peoples and civilizations, and an important focus of interaction between
East and West. From an early time, the area was settled by Semitic tribes called
the Canaanites. By the second millennium B.C. the Philistines, a seaward people,

1 The name Palestine originated from a Greek word that was in turn derived from
the Hebrew word for "the land of the Philistines."
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settled on the eastern coasts of the Mediterranean and mixed with the local
Canaanite population. Together they produced a distinct sedentary culture
based on agriculture, fishing, and trade, and built several cities including Gaza,
Ekron, and Ashdod, which survive to this day. At about 1200 B.C. Hebrew tribes
entered Palestine and by 1000 B.C. created a kingdom that eventually split into
two, Israel and Judah. These kingdoms were eventually destroyed: Israel by
Assyria in 721 B.C. and Judah by Babylon in 587 B.C. In the centuries that
followed, Palestine was conquered by a succession of invaders, including the
Persians, the Greeks, and the Romans.
By 641 A.D. Arab Muslim armies ended Roman and Byzantine rule of
Palestine which had lasted for about 500 years. Within a few centuries Islam and
the Arabic language became prevalent in the region. The Byzantine province of
Palaestina Prima (the name that the Byzantines gave to Palestine) became the
military and administrative djund (province) of Filastine2 of the Islamic Caliphate
(Khalidi 1984, p. 28). The boundaries and physical characteristics of Filastine
were recorded by medieval Arab and Muslim geographers:
Filastine is the Westernmost of the provinces of Syria. In its greatest length
from Rafah to the boundary of Al Lajjun (Legio) it would take a rider two
days to travel over; and the like time to cross the province in its breadth
from Yafa (Jaffa) to Riha (Jericho). Zugar (Zoar) and the country of Lot's
People (Diyar Qawm Lot), Al Jibal (the mountains of Edom) and Ash
Sharah as far as Ailah--Al Jibal and Ash Sharah being two separate
provinces, but lying contiguous one to the other--are included in Filastine,
and belong to its government ... Filastine is the most fertile of the Syrian
provinces. Its capital and largest city is Al Ramlah, but the Holy City (of
Jerusalem) comes very near this last in size. (Istakhri and Ibn Hawkal cited
in Le Strange 1890, p. 28)

2 Filastine is

the Arabic name for Palestine.
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From the beginning of the 11th century till the middle of the 16th century,
Palestine was incorporated into the non-Arab Muslim empires of the Seljuks, and
Mamluks, interrupted by brief intervals of Crusaders' occupation between 1098
A.D. and 1291 A.D (The Times Atlas of World History 1993).
During the four centuries from 1516 A.D. until the end of World War I, the
whole region of southwest Asia, including Palestine, was under the control of the
Ottoman Empire. In 1887 the Ottomans divided Palestine into three
administrative units: the Sanjak (district) of Jerusalem, the Sanjak of Nablus, and
the Sanjak of Acre. The two districts of Nablus and Acre were administratively
part of the vilayet (province) of Beirut. Jerusalem, because of its religious
importance, was governed directly by Constantinople. The areas east of the
Jordan river (which later became Trans-Jordan) were administrated separately
from the three Palestinian districts and formed part of the vilayet of Syria (Khalidi
1984, p. 32).
Prior to the end of the First World War the British and French governments
devised secret plans to divide the Arab areas of the Ottoman Empire between
them. Under the Sykes-Picot secret pact of May 1916, Britain and France agreed
to set up two Arab states in the area between Damascus and Aqaba. One of
those states was to be under French control, the other under British control.
Palestinian coastal areas, with the exception of a British enclave around the port
cities of Acre and Haifa, were to be placed under the joint control of Britain and
France (see Figure 1). However, at the end of the First World War these plans
were abandoned. Syria and Lebanon were occupied by France and placed under
its mandate, while Trans-Jordan and Palestine were placed under British mandate
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Towards the end of the 19th century, Jewish nationalists started to
publicize their territorial claims to Palestine. Jewish nationalism, known as
Zionism, was a European-inspired political movement in the late 1880s that had
the goal of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. The rise of anti-semitism in
Russia and Europe contributed greatly to the rise of Zionism, but the motives of
the early Zionist were not directed towards the realization of an abstract "state
idea." Rather they were interested in fleeing persecution and finding a safe
haven. Not until the late 1890s was the idea of establishing a western-style
nation-state fully developed.
The idea of creating a Jewish state was proposed by Theodore Hertz!
(regarded as the "father" of political Zionism) in a 1896 book entitled Der
Judenstaat ("The Jewish State," subtitled "An Attempt at a Modern Solution to
the Jewish Question"). Hertz! wrote:
The idea which I have developed in this pamphlet is an ancient one. It is
the restoration of the Jewish state ... I shall do no more than suggest what
cogs and wheels comprise the machinery I propose, trusting that better
mechanics than myself will be found to carry the work out ... The world
needs the Jewish state; therefore it will arise. (Mahler 1991, p. 6)
Zionism represented an unconventional form of nationalism where "it
evolved outside of the territory toward which it was directed, and the target of
the movement, the Jewish population, was scattered throughout the world rather
than being concentrated in one geographic area" (ibid., p. 61). However, before
being entitled to a state Jews had to constitute a "nation." This presented
Zionists with a dilemma, and in order to solve it they attempted to "manipulate the
Jewish religious identity into support for the misconcept of a Jewish national
identity and to persuade Jews that they have a national obligation" to a
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nation-state (Abboushi 1982, p. 1). The next step for Hertzl, and for the Zionists,
was to find the "territory" on which to construct the future Jewish state.
Palestine was their "territorial" choice due to its religious and historic significance.
Zionism transferred the religious notion of the "Promised land" into a territorial
claim, and the religious yearning to "return" to it into a "political dogma" (ibid., p.
6). Although parts of Palestine were historically inhabited by Jews, Zionists
declared that all of Palestine fell within their territorial rights. The Zionist
movement created a slogan that best described the nature of their quest: "A land
without a people for people without a land" (quoted in Zogby 1981, p. 7).
Inspite of that claim, Palestine was not empty of people. At the time of this
Zionist's declaration there were about 600,000 Palestinian Arabs living in the
area (ibid., p. 7).
The Zionist plans envisioned a unique form of settler colonialism, differing
from French and British colonial schemes in a fundamental way: the Zionist not
only wanted to build a colony in a place occupied by others, they literally
"sought to replace them"3 (ibid., p. 13). In 1895, Hertzl articulated the essence of
this Zionist goal:
We shall have to spirit the penniless population [Palestinians] across the
border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while
denying it any employment in our own country. Both the process of
expropriation and the removal of the poor must be carried out discreetly
and circumspectly. (Quoted in Said 1979, p. 13)
3 This attitude can be seen as the product of the European origins of the leadership
of the Zionist movement Political Zionism matured in an era of European imperialism and
colonialism and its ideological traits exemplify that period (Brenner 1983). An explanation
of this European attitude is given by Middle Eastern scholar Maxime Rodinson where he
demonstrated that "every territory situated outside that world [Europe] was considered
empty -- not of inhabitants, of course, but constituting a kind of cultural vacuum, and
therefore suitable for colonization" (Rodinson 1968, p. 14), also see (Rodinson 1973).
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To accomplish this goal the Zionist movement had to try to accommodate
the different strategic interests of the imperial powers. Ever shifting political
maneuvers were needed to gain the support of different competing powers, both
before and during WWI. Eventually the Zionist concentrated their effort to
accommodate British interest. In 1914 the editor of the British Manchester
Guardian summed up the British strategic interest in Palestine:
That on general strategic grounds it is exceedingly desirable that the
present too contracted frontiers of Egypt should be expanded ... that a
buffer-state in Southern Syria might be expected to work with equal
effectiveness as in India, and with greater smoothness . . . and that if this
buffer-state became a dominion or genuine colony it would be a source of
great strength to us in the Eastern Mediterranean, both politically and
ultimately militarily, and finally, that the only possible colonizers on a great
and worthy scale in Palestine are the Jews. (Quoted in Zogby 1981, p. 12)
The above quote provides a crude picture of how Zionist and British
imperial interests concurred. Although the British gave promises to the Arabs in
order to secure their support for Britain's war effort, they secretly favored the
Zionist. Lord Balfour, British foreign secretary, wrote that:
In Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting
its inhabitants as to their wishes ... Zionism ... is of far greater importance
... than the desire and prejudice of the 700,000 Arabs who inhabit that
ancient land. (Quoted in Zogby 1981, p. 14)
With such views in mind Lord Balfour needed little convincing to support
the Zionist goal in the 1917 Balfour Declaration:
His Majesty's government view with favour the establishment in Palestine
of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors
to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that
nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of
existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political
status enjoyed by Jews in any other country. (The Middle East and North
Africa 1990, p. 68)
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The Zionist movement went even farther and used biblical territorial
descriptions as the basis for its extraterritorial claims (See Genesis 15:18-21;
Abboushi 1982, p. 6). In 1919 the world Zionist Organization presented a
memorandum to the Paris Peace Conference that described the territorial extent of
their Jewish state:
The whole of Palestine, Southern Lebanon, including the towns of Tyre
and Sidon, the head waters of the Jordan River on Mount Hermon and the
Southern portion of the Litani River; the Golan Heights in Syria, including
the town of Quneitra, the Yarmuk River and Al-Himmeh hot springs; the
whole of the Jordan Valley, the Dead Sea, and the eastern highlands up to
the outskirts of Amman, thence in a southerly direction along the Hedjaz
railway to the Gulf of Aqaba; in Egypt, from El-Arish, on the
Mediterranean coast, in a straight line in a southerly direction to Sharm
El-Sheikh on the Gulf of Aqaba. (The Middle East and North Africa 1990,
p. 497) (see Figure 2)
It was clear that the existence of a resident Palestinian Arab population
was incompatible with this Zionist goal. The Zionist movement was determined
to "de-Arabize"4 Palestine and to transform it into a "mono-religious" Jewish
state (Flapan 1979, p. 56).
With the end of WWI the league of Nations entrusted the Mandate for
Palestine to Britain on July 24th, 1922 (see Figure 3). Britain's "National Home"
policy was included as an essential part of the text of the Mandate. Article 2 of
the Mandate stated that "the Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the
country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will
secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home." To achieve such
conditions Article 4 of the Mandate called for "An appropriate Jewish Agency" to

4 This term was used by the late Palestinian geographer Bashir Nijim (1984) to
describe the essence of Zionist colonization of Palestine.
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be recognized "as a public body for the purpose of advising and cooperating
with the Administration of Palestine," and to ensure the creation of the "Jewish
National Home," Article 6 stated that the Mandatory "shall facilitate Jewish
immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in cooperation with
the Jewish Agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land,
including State Lands and waste lands not required for public purposes."
Immediately after enacting the Mandate, the World Zionist Organization (WZO)
was recognized as that Jewish Agency (The Middle East and North Africa 1990,
p. 70).
The Palestinian Arabs did not react passively to these developments. They
resisted both the British Mandate and Zionist practices. They saw British
imperialism and Zionism as barriers to the achievement of their own national
aspirations. The struggle for independence from British rule and against Jewish
immigration to Palestine became central to the development of Palestinian
nationalism between the two world wars. Palestinians realized that British
policies were systematically undermining their struggle for independence while, at
the same time, strengthening the Zionist drive to colonize Palestine. Palestinian
resistance culminated in the 1936-1939 revolt, during which Palestinians fought
both the British army and a collection of Zionist terrorist groups (the Haganah,
the Irgun, and the Sterng Gang). After intense fighting that left more than 19,000
Palestinians dead and wounded, the revolt was finally crushed (Khaldi 1984, pp.
187-197).
Throughout the Mandate period, British authorities tried to present
themselves as an honest broker between Palestinians and Zionists. In an effort to
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stop the rising violence in Palestine, the British introduced several proposals that
were primarily intended, either to regulate Jewish immigration into Palestine in
order to calm Palestinian anger, or to propose partition plans in order to satisfy the
Zionists by providing territory for a Jewish state. All these British proposals
failed. The Zionist movement was determined to achieve a complete possession
of the land of Palestine and to remove the Palestinian people from it. Zionists
stated their aim blatantly and without apologies. As Joseph Weitz, the person in
charge of the Colonization Department of the Jewish Agency, put it:
Between ourselves it must be clear that there is no room for both peoples
together in this country ... we shall not achieve our goal of being an
independent people with the Arabs in this small country. The only
solution is a Palestine, at least Western Palestine (West of the Jordan River)
without Arabs ... And there is no other way than to transfer the Arabs
from here to the neighboring countries, to transfer all of them; not one
village, not one tribe, should be left ... only after this transfer will the
country be able to absorb the millions of our brethren. There is no other
way out. (Quoted in Hallaj 1988, p. 5)
The Zionist cause was strengthened by the influx into Palestine of a large
number of European Jews fleeing Nazi persecution. By the end of 1946, Jews
constituted 31 % of the total population in the area (Abu-Lughod 1986, p. 27).
In 1947, two years after the end of WWII, the British decided to transfer
the crisis they created to the newly founded United Nations.5 On November 29,
1947, the U.N. General Assembly adopted resolution 181 (II) which called for the
partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states, the termination of the Mandate
and a phased withdrawal of British armed forces. The partition plan divided
Palestine into eight parts: three parts were to be allocated to the Jewish state and
5 It should be noted that in November 1947, the United Nations was less than two
years old, and that much of the world's population were still living under colonial rule and
were not represented by the organization.
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three to the Arab state. The seventh part was to form an Arab enclave around the
city of Jaffa which fell within one of the parts designated to Jews. Jerusalem, the
eighth part, was to be put under an International Trusteeship Council of the U.N.
(The United Nations and the Question of Palestine, 1985, pp. 2-5). The
Palestinians rejected the partition of their own country. The Zionist movement
headed by the Jewish Agency gave the partition its nominal acceptance (see
Figure 4).
The British withdrew their forces from Palestine on May 13, 1948. On
May 14, 1948 the Zionist leader Ben Gurion declared the creation of the State of
Israel. The Palestinians along with the neighboring Arab countries refused to
recognize this declaration. In the war that followed (1948-1949) the Zionists
were able to defeat the ill-equipped Arab forces. As a result of the war, four-fifths
of the land of Palestine, including large areas reserved for the Arab state in the
partition plan, fell under the direct control of the new Jewish state.6 More than
700,000 Palestinians lost their homes and lands and became stateless refugee in
neighboring countries (Khalidi 1984; Morris 1987). During 1949, separate
armistice agreements were signed under U.N. auspices between Israel and Egypt,
Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon.?
Following the 1948-1949 war, Arab opposition to Israel continued
unabated. Full-scale fighting broke out again in 1956 (the Suez-Sinai War), 1967

6 By January 1949, Israel had extended its area by about 5,000 sq km (1,930 sq
mi) beyond the 15,500 sq km (4,983 sq mi) allocated to the Jewish state in the U.N. 1947
partition resolution (Khalidi 1984, pp. 305-313).
7 The armistice lines served as Israel's unofficial boundaries until the outbreak of
the 1967 Six-Day War.
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(the Six-Day War), and 1973 (the Yorn Kippur/Ramadan War). As a result of the
1967 June war, Israel occupied the rest of the area of Mandate Palestine (the
Gaza Strip and the West Bank including East Jerusalem), as well as parts of the
Syrian territory of the Golan Heights and the whole of Egypt's Sinai (see Figure

5).
In 1979, Israel and Egypt signed the Camp David peace treaty which led
to an Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. No progress, however, was made with respect
to the status of the Israeli Occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Israel's intense, intermittent, fighting with the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) led to the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon which was
intended to eliminate the PLO' s military presence from that country. Israel
withdrew in 1985, but maintained a 10-20 km wide security zone in South
Lebanon.
The harsh socioeconomic conditions of the Israeli military occupation of
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip led to the start of the Palestinian Intifadah8
(Uprising) on December 9, 1987. Israel attempted to crush the uprising with force
but ultimately failed.
The 1991 Persian Gulf War and the breakup of the Soviet Union changed
the geopolitical order in the Middle East and brought the Palestinian Question
back to the spotlight of international politics. In October 1991, a U.S.-Soviet
sponsored peace conference was held in Madrid. After the conference, bilateral
negotiations were started between Israel and the surrounding Arab countries.

B Intifadah

is an Arabic word that means shaking off.
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Bilateral talks also started between Israel and a Palestinian delegation from the
West Bank and Gaza Strip after it got the approval of the PLO. After 10 rounds
of talks, spread over two years, bilateral talks between Palestinians and Israelis
reached a deadlock over the issues of Jerusalem and Jewish settlements.
At the same time that bilateral talks were taking place in Washington, the
PLO and Israel were conducting intense behind-the-scenes negotiations in Oslo,
Norway. After fifteen sessions of secret talks, the two sides were able to reach an
agreement. On September 13, 1993, Israel and the PLO signed a Declaration of
Principals (DOP)9 that articulated the guidelines of peace negotiations between
the two over a five year period.
Article I of the DOP sets forth as the goal of the negotiations between
Israel and the Palestinians "to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Governing
Authority [PISGA], the elected council, (the "Council") for the Palestinians
people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding
five years, leading to permanent settlement based on Security Council
Resolutions 242 and 338," with the understanding that permanent status
negotiations will lead to the implementation of both resolutions.

9 The PLO-Israeli Declaration of Principals on Interim Self-Government
Arrangements (DOP) is also referred to as the PLO-Israel Accord, the Oslo Agreement, and
sometimes the Gaza-Jericho First Agreement The DOP consists of the following
documents: (1) the text of the Declaration itself; (2) four annexes dealing, in turn, with
elections, early withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, Israeli-Palestinian
economic cooperation, and Israeli-Palestinian cooperation at the regional level; and (3) a
series of Agreed Minutes amplifying various articles of the Declaration. These Agreed
Minutes were separately signed by the parties, and, according to Article XVII of the DOP,
they constitute an "integral part" of the DOP. For a complete text of the DOP see the New
York Times, Wednesday, September 1, 1993, p. A 6.
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The accord also declares that the "jurisdiction" of the Council or PISGA
will cover "West bank and Gaza territory, except for issues that will be
negotiated in the permanent status negotiations."
Moreover, the DOP specifies that public elections should take place in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip no later than nine months after the entry into force of
the accord. Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank, including those
in East Jerusalem, can then elect the above mentioned Council or PISGA which
will be responsible for Palestinian autonomy or self-rule in the West Bank and
Gaza for the duration of the interim period. The "exact mode and conditions of
elections" will, however, be decided upon by an Election Agreement between
Israel and the PLO.
The DOP stipulates that the five-year transitional period begins upon
Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area. And that
"immediately" after withdrawal, the Israeli military government and its "Civil
Administration" will transfer authority to the "authorized Palestinians" in the
following five spheres: Education and Culture, Health, Social Welfare, Direct
Taxation, and Tourism. to Authority transferred to Palestinians in these spheres
"will be of preparatory nature until the inauguration of the Council."
Finally, the remaining issues, including Jerusalem, refugees, Jewish
settlements, security arrangements, borders, and relations with neighboring
countries, will not be covered by the Interim Agreement but are supposed to be
addressed by permanent status negotiations that will commence "not later than
the beginning of the third year of the interim period."
10 The

DOP refers to these spheres as "early empowerment."
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The implementation of the first phase of the DOP was delayed for few
months, but on May 4, 1994, the PLO and Israel reached an agreement in Cairoll
that gave the PLO and its 24-member Palestinian National Authority12 autonomy
over the city of Jericho and parts of the Gaza Strip.13 On August 29, 1994, the
two sides reached an agreement over the terms of "early empowerment" in the
above-mentioned five spheres. The transfer of authority in the five spheres was
completed on December 1, 1994.
However, as of April of 1995, the PLO and Israel had not reached an
agreement on the "exact mode and conditions" of the elections which according
to the DOP, should have taken place in July,of 1994. The two sides are currently
negotiating over this issue ("The What, When, How and Who of the Palestinian
Elections" 1994).
There is widespread disagreement over the sufficiency of the DOP and
Cairo Agreement to bring about a just solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Some observers believe that these two agreements will eventually lead to the
creation of a Palestinian state. Others, disagree, and argue that the
implementation of these agreements will jeopardize Palestinian quest for a truly
independent and viable state. This research will examine both of these positions

11

Agreement on the Gaza Strip and The Jericho Area, Cairo, Egypt, May 4, 1994.

12 The Palestinian National Authority is the interim government for the self rule
areas of Jericho and the Gaza Strip pending elections for the Palestinian Autonomy
Council.
13 40% of the Gaza Strip is still under Israeli control including 19 Jewish
settlements.
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against the backdrop of the main problems and obstacles facing the establishment
of a Palestinian state.
The Research Problem
The aim of this research is to identify and analyze the existing as well as
potential obstacles and problems that any future Palestinian entity will inevitably
face en route to statehood.
This thesis will try to determine if the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,
together or separately, constitute an adequate spatial framework for the creation
of a viable and independent Palestinian state. The research will try to determine if
the classical requirements14 of state formation can be met within the geographic
and political context of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. To accomplish this,
the research focuses on the main obstacles and problems associated with the
following:

1.
2.
3.
4.

Territorial definition and delimitation of a Palestinian state.
Palestinian citizenship and political representation.
Economic viability of a Palestinian state.
Functions/responsibilities of a Palestinian state apparatus.

The many proposals for Palestinian autonomy and statehood suggested
prior to the 1993 PLO-Israeli Declaration of Principals (DOP) have failed.15 This
thesis, thus, uses the DOP and the subsequent Cairo Agreement as the starting
point for the analysis. One issue to be addressed is the sufficiency of the DOP

14 See Chapter 2 on the definition of a state and its political and geographical
requirements.

15 Several proposal directed at a political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict have
been presented over the years but were not implemented: the Rogers plan, the Kissinger
plan, the Reagan plan, the Fahd plan, etc. For text of these plans see Middle East and
. North Africa (1990).
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and Cairo Agreement for the creation of a Palestinian state. In other words, does
the DOP and Cairo Agreement enhance or diminish the prospects of statehood for
the Palestinian people?
The process of Palestinian state formation is expected to be gradual,
though not necessarily linear, and will probably require the Palestinian polity to
go through several phases before it reaches the status of statehood. The
identification and classification of problems and obstacles that are likely to occur,
on the road to Palestinian statehood, will provide a context for evaluating the
feasibility of creating a Palestinian state. Such a Palestinian state cannot exist
until the main territorial, political, and economic problems facing it are adequately
resolved. Any future Palestinian entity that falls short of meeting all the essential
requirements of a state cannot be considered as such.
Figure 6 offers a conceptual representation of the process of Palestinian
state formation. It depicts the main spatial and temporal elements of the
movement towards a Palestinian state. The figure outlines the main political and
geographic prerequisites that any Palestinian political entity has to satisfy in order
to reach the status of statehood. The figure describes three general geopolitical
phases in the process: (1) the status quo, (2) the transitional phase and (3) the
geopolitical outcome. It also illustrates the effects of the different territorial,
economic, and political obstacles on the progression from one phase to another
and on the outcome of the process as a whole. Overall, Figure 6 should be
treated as a generalized conceptual road map to the issues addressed by this
thesis.
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A note on maps and transliteration
All maps used in this thesis have been drawn as originals or redrawn from
existing maps. When a map is said to be "From X," it should be understood that,
while redrawn, it is substantially the same in appearance as a map published
elsewhere by "X." On a map, the use of the expression "Source: X" indicates
that, while the map maybe new or similar in appearance to a map published
elsewhere, the information displayed on the map is, at least partially, to be found
in "X."
Arabic geographical and personal names were spelled in the same way
they appeared in the cited references (books, journals, maps, etc.). In some cases
place names were changed to conform with the form most easily recognizable to
English-speakers, e.g. "Jerusalem" rather than "Al Quds." A system of Arabic
transliteration has been used only in the following cases:
-

for transliterating the titles of Arabic books used as references in the
thesis; and
for transliterating Arabic geographical names when a reference map's
spelling diverged markedly from common, or widely used Arabic
spelling.

The transliteration system emphasized "spelling" rather than
pronunciation (thus "Al-Ni_gal rather than "An-Nida!") and followed the
technique used most often in transliterating the Arabic script of the Holly Qur' an
(see Appendix ).

25

CHAPTER2
CHARACTERISTICS OF A STATE
What is a State?
There are several basic geographic and political characteristics that a
politically organized area should possess in order for it to qualify as a state. These
basic characteristics are considered the building blocks or major components of
statehood, and they are the ones that distinguish a state from other kinds of
politically organized areas.16
Traditionally, a state has been defined as a "politically organized body of
people occupying a finite territory under a government competent in securing
internal obedience and maintaining essential freedom from external intrusion or
control" (Norris and Haring 1980, p. 65). Similarly, Glassner and de Blij (1980)
contend that "in order for a place to be considered a statel 7 in the strictest sense it
must possess to a reasonable degree the following [geographic] characteristics":
(1) land territory (2) a permanent resident population (3) a government (4) an
organized economy, and (5) a circulation system. It also should posses two
political criteria: (1) sovereignty and (2) recognition (pp. 43, 44).
Sovereignty is generally defined as the ultimate authority and control by a
government of a state over its territory and the people within that territory,
bounded by political borders (Johnston 1986, p. 441). This means that a
16 Politically organized areas exist at different levels of geographic scale from the
local to the global: city, county, township, province, etc.
17 The term state is used in another sense in a federal system, such as the United
States of America or India, to refer to one of the semiautonomous political entities that
makeup the federal (or national) government
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sovereign state has "the right to exercise therein (in its territory), to the exclusion
of any other state, the function[s] of a state" (quoted in Joffe 1994, p. 1). In this
sense a government of a state is sovereign over its territory if its authority within
that territory is not challenged. It follows from this definition that the "precise
determination of the territorial extent of a state is crucially important in
determining the extent of its jurisdiction" (ibid., p. 1). This highlights the
importance of political boundaries in the contemporary international system of
states and the potential of such boundaries in the triggering of territorial conflicts
(see Starr and Most 1983; Prescott 1987). In the case of this thesis, political
boundaries and territorial sovereignty are considered to be cardinal issues to be
settled in creating a Palestinian state.
In the real world, state sovereignty is influenced by many geopolitical and
economic factors. Sovereignty of a state can be seen as a function of the
"structural position" of that state within the world-economy (Taylor 1985, pp.
26, 27). Today's international capitalist system is roughly divided into core,
semi-periphery, and periphery zones,18 which are nominal descriptions of complex
production relations that determine the relative hierarchical position of an entity
within the world economy (ibid., pp. 15-18). A state's position within a core,
semi-periphery, or periphery zone affects its political and economic stability, and
in turn, the ability to defend its sovereignty. This is because the power possessed
by a state is also determined by its structural position. Structural power, as it is
18 Core and periphery donate to political and economic processes that could exist in
any country or region. In simplified terms, "core processes consist of relations that
incorporate relatively high wages, advanced technology and a diversified production mix.
Whereas periphery processes involve low wages, more rudimentary technology and a
simple production mix" (Taylor 1985, p. 17).

27
called, is a function of four elements or sources: "control over security, control
over production, control over credit, and control over knowledge, beliefs and
ideas" (Strange 1988, p. 26).19 Consequently, as a state's structural power
changes according to these four elements so does its sovereignty. Therefore,
sovereignty of a state is not absolute or static, but relative and dynamic in nature.
Many economic and political factors can help undermine or strengthen the
sovereignty of a state. These factors can operate at different levels of
geographical scale: the national (within the nation-state) level, the regional
(inter-state) level, and the global (international) level. Here, it is important to keep
in mind that the nature of sovereignty varies within individual states, and that
different states might employ varying territorial strategies to maintain their
sovereignty .20
There are several ways in which states extend their sovereignty both
legally and illegally from an international law perspective21: conquest, despite its
illegality, has been the most effective method of extending state sovereignty
throughout history; "occupation, whereby control is established over previously

19 For a more elaborate discussion of the concept of state power in international
relations see Toffler (1990).

20 Numerous factors play a role in determining the kind of strategies being used.
Again, these factors can be either internal or external to specific states.

21 International law is traditionally defined as the body of laws governing relations
between sovereign states, also referred to as the Law of Nations. It is based on a multitude
of sources: multilateral and bilateral treaties between states (or international organizations
such as the United Nations and the World Bank), customary law, and "general principles
of law." An international system of sovereign states, therefore, demands that the territorial
integrity and political independence of the respective states be honored (Butler 1987).
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unclaimed territory; prescription, when effective control is exercised for such a
time over an area that sovereignty may be deemed to have been extended to it;

cession, whereby land is transferred from one country to another by treaty; and
finally accretion, which describes the process by which the territory of a state is
extended through an act of nature" (Burghardt 1973, quoted in Johnston 1986,
p. 442).
Boundaries are considered the geographic limits of state jurisdiction and
sovereignty. Ideally, boundaries are not treated as simple lines on a map, but
rather as vertical planes that extend up through airspace, and down into the
subsurface of a state's territory. Thus, boundaries define an area that is three
dimensional in scope (Glassner and de Blij 1980, p. 84) (see Figure 7). In this
respect, boundaries differ from frontiers, whereby the later is defined as an area or
zone (not a line nor plane) situated beyond the commonly recognized limits of a
political unit and into which expansion can occur (ibid.). Often, boundaries are
drawn either through empty frontiers or within frontiers separating two adjacent
states. In general, the contemporary process of boundary-making involves five
identifiable stages: (1) Definition of the boundary, whereby the area or terrain
through which the boundary runs is adequately described; (2) Delimitation of
the boundary cartographically; (3) Demarcation of the boundary, i.e, making it
visible on the ground; and (4) Administration of the boundary, establishing
regular procedures for its maintenance and supervision (Glassner and de Blij
1980, p. 84; Norris and Haring 1980, pp. 123-126).
Many political geographers have attempted to classify boundaries
according to different criteria. Hartshorne (1936), for example, classified
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boundaries into four categories according to the chronological order of their
establishment: antecedent, subsequent, superimposed, and cultural-molding.
Jones (1959), on the other hand, traced the development of the boundary
concept using historical examples. He identified five kinds of boundaries: natural,
national, contractual, geometric, and power-political.22
In addition to boundaries, shape and size of a state are also important
elements of its spatial structure. Size, for example, can have detrimental effects in
terms of a state's access to natural resources. It can also have major geopolitical
and strategic ramification for a state's defensibility in face of military action by
other states. The same can be true of the shape of a state. Moreover, both shape
and size, can have considerable effects on the territorial cohesiveness of a state,
and in turn, can influence its ability to administer and govern its national territory.
Contemporary states vary greatly in shape and size. In general, states are
considered very small if they are under 10,000 square miles, small if they are
between 10,000 to 60,000 square miles, medium-size if they are between 60,000
to 140,000 square miles, large if they are between 140,000 and 1 million, and very
large if they exceed 1 million square miles (Glassner and de Blij 1980,_ pp. 75-76).
There are four basic recognized categories of a state's shape: compact, elongated,
prompted, perforated, and fragmented (see Figure 8).
In any event, every viable functioning state, regardless of size or shape,
has a core-area that is considered to be a central and indispensable part of its
territory. Typically, a core-area contains a large portion of the state's population,

For further discussion of boundaries and frontiers see Kristof (1959), Starr and
Most (1983), and Prescott (1987).
22
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the backbone of its transportation network, its major industrial activities, and a
sizable percentage of its total employment. The core-area is also considered the
focal point of the political and cultural activities of a state as well as the nucleus
of its ecumene23: the part of a state's territory in which the government functions
most effectively and in which the population participate actively in the political
life of the country (Norris and Haring 1980, p. 73; Glassner and de Blij 1980, pp.
94-99).
The capital city is also considered a major component of the contemporary
state. It is the nerve center of the political activities of the state, the location of
the major state institutions and organs of government, and in most cases the
headquarter of the main commercial, and educational organizations.
State and Nation
The terms state and nation have been used interchangeably and
synonymously on the mistaken assumption that every state constitutes a nation
and vice versa. By definition, a nation and a state are not necessarily the same
thing. In general, a nation refers to a community of people who share a sense of
belonging to a common culture. Such a culture can be based on a common
language, religion, history, geographic origin, and sometimes political ideology.
Today, there are states that have more than one nation within their territory, and
there are nations that are divided among one or more states. Indeed, the rise of
modem nationalism in the 19th century brought the concepts of nation and state
into such a close alignment that today it is rare to discuss one of them without an

23 James (1968) defines the ecumene as "the effective national territory, as
distinguished from the total territory" (quoted in Glassner and de Blij 1980, p. 99).
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explicit or implicit reference to the other: a nation-state became viewed as a
nation with a state "wrapped around it" (Glassner and de Blij 1980, p. 46).
Nationalism has been interpreted as a territorial ideology: a "plan" for the
geopolitical organization of society in its quest for statehood (Portugali 1988, p.
155). The substance of nationalist ideology, in the twentieth century, can be
illustrated by its "core doctrine" (Taylor 1985, pp. 126, 127):
1. The world consists of a mosaic of nations.
2. World order and harmony depends upon expressing this mosaic in a
system of free nation-states.
3. Nations are the natural units of society.
4. Nations have a cultural homogeneity based upon common ancestry
and/or history.
5. Every nation requires its 9wn sovereign state for the true expression of
its culture.
6. All nations (rather than states) have an inalienable right to a territory or
homeland.
7. Every individual must belong to a nation.
8. A person's primary loyalty is to the nation.
9. Only through the nation can a person find true freedom.
With these qualities in mind, Portugali (1988) argued that the ideology of
nationalism constituted a sort of a "generative social order" that was able to
"enslave" or contain other social orders such as capitalism and communism (p.
154). This meant that other political ideologies had to organize according to the
principals of nationalism or be crushed by it. To this day, nationalism is a major
source of territorial conflicts around the globe.
Many political geographers have attempted to explain the process of
state-formation, and the role that nationalism plays in that process. Hartshorne
(1950), for example, described two sets of forces: "centrifugal forces" that work
to pull the state apart and, in the opposing direction, "centripetal forces" that
bind it together. Among the "centrifugal forces" Hartshorne listed physical
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characteristics (topography) of the state's territory; linguistic, ethnic, and religious
difference that usually lead to territorial conflicts. On the other hand, Hartshorne
identified the concept of the "state idea" to be one of the most important
"centripetal forces." He argued that the strength of this "idea" is what gives a
state a raison d'etre, a reason for existing. Today, the "state idea" is closely
associated with nationalism.24
Another useful theory of state formation is Jones' (1954) "Unified Field
Theory of Political Geography" which tried to provide a coherent conceptual
framework for state development. Jones identified five stages or "links" in the
process of state formation, each related and connected to one another to form
what he termed the "Idea-Area Chain": political idea, decision, movement, field,
and finally, a politically organized area. To illustrate this "chain" process Jones
applied his theory to the historical process that led to the establishment of the
State of Israel: "Zionism is the idea, the Balfour Declaration of 1917 is the
decision permitting movement (migration) which produces a field (the immigrant
settlement pattern) generating war which defines a state of Israel out of
Palestine" (Taylor 1985, p. 116).

24 Conceptually, Hartshorne's theory will prove to be very useful when applied to

the Palestinian case, especially when identifying and classifying the "forces" that work for
(e.g. Palestinian Nationalism) or against (e.g. Israeli military occupation; physical
separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, etc.) the creation of a Palestinian
state.
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The State: Form, Function, and Apparatus
Political geographers, as well as historians, sociologists, anthropologists,
and others, have all attempted to theorize about the state.25 Many have focused
on the role the state, and its constituent institutions, play in the process of
reproducing and maintaining the social relations of a society. In investigating this
role of the state, political theorists usually draw distinctions between state form,
state function, and state apparatus (Johnston 1986, p. 457). A state's form is
referred to the unique state structure that is formed as a result of specific
socioeconomic and political trends affecting a society. A state's function, on the
other hand, refers to the collective set of activities performed by the various
institutions of the state. In general, a state functions as a "supplier of public
goods and services, regulator and facilitator of the economy, and arbiter between
the many groups which compose society" (ibid.). Finally, state apparatus refers
to the array of institutions and organizations that makeup the state,26 and
through which state functions are executed (ibid.).
Both the form and function of the state is influenced by several economic
and geopolitical factors. The structural position of a state (see above) within the
world economy greatly influence its ability to perform the long list of functions
expected from a contemporary modem state. For example, harsh economic

25 Perceptions of what the state is vary significantly with the different political
ideologies of analysts whether liberal, neoclassical, Marxist, neo-Marxist, etc. The
examination of these various perspectives is out of the scope of this thesis. For further
discussion of the different theories of the state see Taylor (1985, pp. 95-125).
26 State apparatus usually consists of a multitude of sub-apparatuses: political,
legal, repressive, administrative, regulatory, monetary, etc., see (Clark and Dear 1984).
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conditions, reduces a state's ability to generate revenue (e.g. ability to collect
taxes) and in turn diminishes its ability to deliver public goods and services. The
lack of economic resources also inhibits the development of viable state
institutions. The absence of economic stability usually leads to social and
political unrest which forces many poor states to put overemphasis on military
and police power as an instrument of control.
The form of any future Palestinian state will ultimately depend on the
manner in which the main territorial, economic, and political problems facing it are
resolved. The nature of these problems and the sufficiency of their resolution will
also affect the development of a viable Palestinian state apparatus capable of
performing the functions of a modem state. The potential effects of the Oslo and
Cairo agreements (see Chapter 1) on the territorial and political make-up of any
future Palestinian polity are discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAP1ER3
MAIN PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION
This chapter focuses on the main territorial, political, and economic
problems facing the formation of a Palestinian state. These problems will make it
difficult to meet the classical requirements27 of statehood for Palestinians and no
viable independent Palestinian state can be formed without their adequate
resolution. In addition, the nature and political make up of any future Palestinian
political entity will ultimately depend on the ways these problems are addressed
(see Chapter 4).
These problems and obstacles are discussed in the context of the 1993
PLO-Israeli Declaration of Principles (DOP) and the 1994 Agreement on the Gaza
Strip and the Jericho Area (hereafter the Cairo Agreement). The potential effects
of the DOP and Cairo Agreements in mitigating or exasperating the effects of
these problems are explored in this chapter.
Specifically, this chapter analyzes the main obstacles and problems
associated with the following issues: (1) the territorial definition and delimitation
of a Palestinian state, (2) the determination of Palestinian citizenship and political
representation, (3) the establishment of a viable and independent Palestinian
economy, and (4) the specification and execution of the functions and
responsibilities of a Palestinian state apparatus.

27 Discussed in Chapter 2.
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Main Territorial Problems
An internationally recognized state must have a defined and delimited
territory. It should also have sovereignty and jurisdiction over that territory.
Accordingly, for any future Palestinian political entity to qualify as a state it needs
to have territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction over a clearly demarcated territory.
The PLO's present goal of creating a Palestinian state in the West Bank
and Gaza strip is faced with serious territorial obstacles.28 Israel, so far, objects to
the creation of a Palestinian state in these geographical areas (see Table 1), and
many Israeli territorial practices clearly interfere with the realization of such a
goal.
One of the most serious obstacles to the attainment of a national territory
for a Palestinian state is manifested in the presence of a large number of Jewish
settlements throughout the occupied Palestinian territories including East
Jerusalem. Since 1967, Israel has established over 200 Jewish settlements in the
West Bank and Gaza. These settlements were built in "blocks" which ensured
the fragmentation of Palestinian control over land and resources and limited the
spatial expansion of Palestinian villages and towns. The spatial distribution of
Jewish settlement also divided the Palestinian population into discontinuous
clusters which makes the formation of a "physically unified" Palestinian ecumene
extremely difficult, and thus makes the creation of a Palestinian state much harder

28 Prior to November 1988,

the declared aim of the PLO was the establishment of

a secular democratic state for Muslims, Christians, and Jews, over the whole territory of
British Mandatory Palestine. This goal was dropped for a two-state solution at the
November 1988 session of the Palestine National Council meeting in Algiers.

39

TABLE 1
Land Area
of Israel, West Bank, and Gaza Strip
Within the Limits of the Armistice Lines of 1949-1950 (Green Line)

LandAreat

Size of Territory

Israel, West Bank & Gaza Strip

27,365 km2

Israel

20,500 km2

West Bank & Gaza strip

5,865 km2

West Bank

5,500 km2

Gaza Strip

365 km2

t Excluding "No Man's Land" of the armistice agreements of 1949-1950.
Source: McColl and Newman (1992, p. 343).

40
(Cohen 1986, p. 96) (see Figures 9 & 10).29 Many Israeli settlements were placed
directly on the "Green Line" (the 1949 armistice line that used to separate Israel
from the occupied territories before the 1967 war) in order to effectively erase it
(Newman 1994). By "straddling" the Green Line, Jewish settlements obscured
the geographic limits of military occupation and Israeli state sovereignty. This
created the condition for possible future annexation of large portions of the
occupied territories by Israel (Settlement Watch 1991). The placement of
settlements on the Green Line also created a buffer zone which prevented
."territorial continuity" of Arab villages in the Triangle region (within pre-1967
Israel) with Palestinian villages located beyond the Green Line in the West Bank
(Newman 1994, p. 94) (see Figure 11).
Israeli attempts to erase the Green Line reflect the fact that Israel has
refused to recognize the Green Line as a basis for future border demarcation
between itself and any future Palestinian entity. All previous Israeli settlement
plans, whether advocated by the right wing Likud or the Labor Party, reflect this
attitude (see Figures 12 & 13). The same is true of the settlement plans proposed
by the World Zionist Organization, the organization assigned by the Israeli
government to coordinate and administer settlement activities in the occupied
territories (see Figure 14).30
29 Jansen (1993) argues that Israeli settlement activities will lead to the creation of
four "cantons" where Palestinians will be "grouped" and restricted to. These cantons are
located in northern, central, and southern parts of the West Bank and in East Jerusalem.
30 By delegating the settlement administration to the World Zionist Organization
(WZO) the Israeli government can deny direct involvement in the settlement process. Thus
"by operating outside the turbulent arena of Israeli politics, the .WZO ensures that
settlement continue according to long-range plans" (Settlement Watch 1991, p. 3). For
more information on Israeli settlements see Jerusalem Media and Communication Center
(JMCC 1991a,b).
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I Israeli Settlements in the West Bank, December 1993.
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IIsraeli Settlements in the Gaza Strip, February 1992 I '~
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The settlements also serve another purpose: to tip the "demographic
balance" in the region in favor of Israeli Jews and against the local Palestinian
population31 (Newman 1985). As of November 1994, there were about 310,000
Jewish settlers in the occupied territories including East Jerusalem (Aronson
1994). In the late 1980's and early 1990's the increasing pace of settlement
activities occurred in tandem with Israeli efforts to absorb thousands of new
Soviet Jewish immigrants, numbering over 500,000 by the end of 1994.
Neither the recent PLO-Israeli Declaration of Principles (DOP) nor the
Cairo Agreement offers any solution to the problem of Jewish settlements. In fact,
the DOP delays any discussion of this issue to final status negotiations which are
due to start in May of 1996. According to the DOP, Israel is not obliged to
remove any Jewish settlement during the five-year interim period.
Although Article IV of the DOP provides that "the jurisdiction of the
[future Palestinian] Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory," this
jurisdiction will not include the Israeli settlements or the whole of the territory of
the West Bank or Gaza. By refusing to adopt Palestinian proposals to include the
words "all" or "the" before the phrase "West Bank and Gaza Strip", Israeli
negotiators made it clear that the territorial jurisdiction of the Council will not
necessarily cover the entire area of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The language
of Article IV of the DOP is similar to the wording of U.N. Security Council
Resolution 242 of 1967 which deliberately omitted the words "the" or "all" before
the word "territories" as in the phrase: "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from
31 Newman (1985) maintain that the emerging pattern of Jewish settlement in the

West Banlc is not different from that of a traditional process of colonization but with the
added advantage of territorial continuity with the core Israeli population.
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territories occupied in the recent conflict" (Singer 1994, p. 4). This indecisiveness
in the wording of the DOP may provide Israel with a basis to demand the further
exclusion from the Palestinian Council's territorial jurisdiction such areas as "state
lands" or "confiscated lands" which are located outside Israeli settlements. This
would have a dramatic effect on any future territorial definition of a Palestinian
state because almost 65% of the West Bank and 40% of the Gaza Strip are still
under direct Israeli control.32
Similarly, the DOP states that the jurisdiction of the future Palestinian
council will not include Israelis under any circumstances.33 According to the
Agreed Minute to Article IV of the DOP "Israelis will not be subject to laws
legislated by the Council, will not be subject to arrest or detention by Palestinian
police officers, and will not be subject to the jurisdiction of Palestinian courts"
(Ibid., p. 7).
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the council will only cover the "powers and
responsibilities" transferred to it by the Israeli military government. In addition to

32 Israel's direct control of Palestinian land includes categories like state lands,

closed military areas, confiscated lands, "unregistered lands," and "absentee lands." In
1979, the Israeli military government devised a convoluted process to appropriate
Palestinian land. This process relied on the distinction in the old Ottoman land law
between state-owned land (miri) and privately-owned land (mulk). Any land that was not
properly registered during the British mandate or during Jordanian and Egyptian control of
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, was classified as state-owned miri land, and hence subject
to confiscation by Israel (Wing 1993, p. 107).
33 The DOP makes no distinction between Israeli civilians and soldiers, or between
Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and Israelis traveling through the occupied
territories from Israel. All Israelis, without distinction, "shall remain under exclusive Israeli
jurisdiction whether they are in the settlements or military locations or anywhere else in the
West Bank and Gaza strip" (Singer 1994, p. 7).
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the exclusion of Jewish settlements and settlers from Palestinian jurisdiction,
Israeli authorities will continue to have control over Palestinian zoning and
land-use decisions during the implementation of the DOP (Aronson 1994, p. 115).
This is consistent with the long-held Israeli view that future Palestinian
Jurisdiction should only apply to the Palestinian people, but not to land and
natural resources. For example, Israel will continue to have de facto control over
all water resources in the occupied territories. Water resources will be excluded
from Palestinian jurisdiction throughout the 5-year interim period. Since the DOP
does not mention the issue of water, it will be deferred to the final status
negotiations by default. However, it is unlikely that Israel will agree to future
Palestinian jurisdiction over water resources. Israel considers access to
Palestinian water as a strategic issue.34 Close to 40% of the groundwater Israel
uses originates in the occupied territories with two of the three main aquifers on
which Israel depends lie directly under the West Bank (Elmusa 1993). Continued
Israeli control over Palestinian water undermines the sovereignty of any future
Palestinian polity. Overall, the DOP allows the Israeli military government to
remain the ultimate sovereign power in the occupied territories throughout the
interim period.
Another problem that could jeopardize the Palestinian drive for
sovereignty and jurisdictional control may result from the proposed redeployment
of Israeli troops. Article XIII of the DOP calls for a redeployment of Israeli forces

34 For more discussion of the strategic importance of water resources in the ArabIsraeli conflict see Nijim (1990) and Casa (1991).
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in the West Bank35 "outside populated areas" "not later than the eve of
elections for the [Palestinian] Council." Khalidi and Agha (1994) argue that this
process of redeployment will diminish future prospects of an Israeli withdrawal
from the occupied territories in two ways:
First, in order for Israeli forces to fulfill their tasks as specified in the DOP
(security for Israelis and settlements, an defense against external
threats--see Article VII), they must be able to reach almost any part of the
West Bank at relatively short notice. In other words, "redeployment" may
require such a pervasive Israeli military presence on Palestinian territory as
to render any rearrangement of this presence both operationally and
politically insignificant. Second, any attempt to form large self-contained
blocs of settlements to which Israeli forces could "redeploy" along the
lines of Gaza [i.e., similar to what occurred in Gaza in July of 1994] would
pose a serious threat to the territorial and political integrity of the
Palestinian Authority. From a Palestinian perspective, these would appear
as precedential and prejudicial to the final-status negotiations, particularly
in view of the Labor Party's declared aim of partial annexation under the
guise of "territorial compromise." (Quoted in Journal of Palestine
Studies, No. 2, Winter 1995, p.102)
All current Israeli settlement activities and their locational patterns indicate
that Israel continues to pursue some version of the Allon Plan, the master plan
formulated by Israeli Labor Party Minister Yigal Allon in the late sixties, and
which served as the unofficial guide to the deployment of Jewish settlements in
the occupied territories until 1977. The premise of this plan was that "Israel must
have defensible borders. These must be based on the Jordan River and the Rift
Valley, and the Judean Desert. Defensible borders also require a chain of Jewish
settlements which themselves must be under Israeli sovereignty, though without
the annexation of a large Arab population" (Inbari 1994, p. 13).

35 Although the DOP called for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Gaza strip

and the "Jericho area" (Article XIV) what actually took place was a redeployment of Israeli
forces outside Palestinian populated areas and around the nearby Jewish settlements (See
Figures 17 & 18).
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The latest version of the plan (1970), shown in Figure 15, provides for the
annexation by Israel of a 20 kilometer-wide zone from the River Jordan to the
periphery of the Palestinian settlements on the West Bank mountain ridge,
running southward from the city of N ablus to Hebron. It also provides for the
annexation of the "Greater Jerusalem area", from Nebi Samwil to Bethlehem, the
Etzion bloc of Jewish settlements, the Judean Desert up to Hebron (including the
Jewish settlement of Kiryat Arba) and the Sam'u-Yata road. The
densely-populated Palestinian areas on the West Bank mountain ridge and the
northern part of the Gaza Strip were to be handed over to Jordan (Peace Now
1992, pp. 148-154).
Over all, this plan would have Israel annex half of the total area of the
West Bank and three quarters of the Gaza Strip. However, the recent signing of
peace agreements between Israel and the PLO is likely to diminish any future
Jordanian participation in a modified version of the Allon Plan. This, nonetheless,
does not appear to alter the core of the plan, i.e., the annexation of large portion
of Palestinian territory. Frequently, Israeli officials publicly support the
implementation of modified versions of the Allon plan. In a 1994 interview,
Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Belien, one of the architects of the recent peace
agreement with the PLO, affirmed that "as an idea, it [the Allon plan] is far from
being the worst one. The Allon plan will still be one of the options for a
permanent solution" (Press 1994, p. 185). This kind of statement reinforces
Palestinian perception of the settlements as "creeping annexation" (Cohen 1986,
p. 40).
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The Allon Settlement Plan, 1970-1990
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The building of Israeli settlements and other Israeli restrictions on
Palestinian access to land resulted in record levels of Palestinian population
densities, especially in the Gaza Strip. In 1992, the Palestinian population of the
Gaza Strip was about 900,000, with refugees constituting 73% of the total
Palestinian population.36 The overall Palestinian population density in the strip
reached up to 9,300 persons per square mile when measured in terms of land
available for Palestinian use.37 By contrast, the density levels for Jewish settlers
in Gaza averaged 115 persons per square mile (Roy 1993, p. 22). For any future
territorial solution to succeed it must provide Palestinians in the Gaza Strip with
more "breathing space.,,
Another difficult territorial issue is the future status of the city of
Jerusalem.38 The PLO considers the city to be the site of the capital of any future
Palestinian state, a goal vigorously rejected by Israel. All Israeli governments,
without exception, have declared Jerusalem to be the "eternal and undivided
capital of the State of Israel.,, Immediately after capturing Jerusalem in 1967, the
Israelis embarked on an intense campaign to "Israelize, the city in order to alter

36 There are various population estimates for the Gaza Strip. The 900,000 figure

for 1992 is Roy's (1993). For other estimates see Tables 2 and 3 of this thesis.
37 This is one of the highest population densities in the world.
38 Jerusalem was divided as a result of the 1948 war. Israel controlled the western

part of the city while the eastern part became under Jordanian control. As a result of the
1967 six-day war, East Jerusalem fell under Israeli military occupation along with the West
Banlc and the Gaza Strip.
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its international legal status39 and make its repatriation more difficult (Dumper
1992, p. 32). The main objectives of Israel were clear from the first days of the
occupation: to limit the Arab population of Jerusalem to a manageable minority
and to build as many Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem as possible in order to
extend "irreversible" Israeli sovereignty over the city (Rowley 1984, p. 201).
These settlements were constructed with a "fortress-like" design in order to serve
as a defensible perimeter against any future Arab attack from the east or south.
Also these Israeli settlements restricted the growth of Arab East Jerusalem and
separated it from its West Bank hinterland (Dumper 1992, p. 52; Efrat and Noble
1988, p. 400). The Israelis built more than a dozen of these settlements by 1992
radically altering the Arab character of East Jerusalem (see Figure 16).
The PLO-Israeli DOP does not solve the dispute over Jerusalem and delays
any discussion of its political fate to final status negotiations. As the time
approaches when Jerusalem will be on the agenda of the peace talks (May 1996),
the Israeli authorities have been accelerating settlement activities in order to
create what is commonly referred to as facts on the ground. Israeli politicians are
not apologetic about their stance on Jerusalem. As Israeli Deputy Defense
Minister Mordechai Gur put it: "Israel will create territorial continuity throughout
Greater Jerusalem, an achievement which Israel will present to Palestinian
negotiators as a geographic fact" (Press 1994, p. 185).
Israeli settlement policy in the West Bank and Gaza, including East
Jerusalem, will indeed make the prospects of attaining a non-fragmented territory
39 According to United Nations Security Council Resolution 181, of November
29, 1947, Jerusalem and Bethlehem were to be regarded as corpus separatum under UN
jurisdiction, see Chapter 1.
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for a Palestinian state much more difficult. As long as the Jewish settlements are
not removed, a stable territorial solution based on UN Security Council
Resolution 242 seems impossible.40 PLO Chairman Yaser Arafat expressed his
frustration with Israeli settlement policies saying that if they [the settlements]
were not stopped any future Palestinian state will end up looking like "Swiss
cheese full of holes" (Mahoney 1994). Territorial discontinuity, therefore, will
remain a major problem in establishing sovereignty and Jurisdictional control for
any future Palestinian entity, let alone a full functioning state.
Using the argument of security needs as a pretext, Israel is likely to demand
extra territorial rights over Jewish settlements, military installations, major
highways and roads in the occupied territories during and probably well beyond
the end of the proposed 5-year interim period.
Another major territorial problem in creating a future Palestinian state is the
physical separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The two areas
are separated, on average, by a 90-mile wide area controlled by Israel. This
physical separation can have serious ramification on the ability to create a
functioning unitary Palestinian state including both areas. Territorial
discontinuity can hamper effective economic integration, and complicate
administrative arrangements. Although the 1994 Cairo Agreement provided for
guaranteed safe passage by Palestinians between Gaza and Jericho, Israel had not

40 UN Security Council resolution 242, of November 22, 1967, calls for the
"withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" and the
"termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of
the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and
their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts
of force."
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yet fulfilled this obligation, and passage between the two areas remains subject to
seemingly arbitrary Israeli restrictions. There are of course many examples of
countries that have been able to effectively overcome territorial discontinuity
between their national territories as in the case of the United States (Alaska and
Hawaii), Malaysia, Indonesia, etc. On the other hand there are countries for
which a geographic separation has proved fatal to their ability to maintain a
unitary state, such as East and West Pakistan which split in 1971, the former
becoming Bangladesh.
The territorial delimitation of any future Palestinian entity will certainly be
problematic. During the signing ceremony of the Cairo Agreement, PLO
Chairman Yaser Arafat refused to sign the six maps that defined the territorial
extent of Palestinian autonomy in the Gaza Strip and the "Jericho Area." Israel
and the PLO disagreed on the size of the "Jericho Area": the PLO wanted a
geographical expanse covering 300 square kilometers while Israel insisted that
the Jericho Area will not exceed 26 square kilometers. Finally, Chairman Arafat
agreed to sign the maps after adding one sentence (in Arabic) next to his
signature saying that these maps are still subject to further negotiations (see
Figures 17 & 18).
In any event, the territorial extent of any future Palestinian polity will not
be determined until the conclusion of the final status negotiation due to start in
May of 1996. The PLO-Israeli DOP stipulates that the final status negotiations
should lead to the implementation of U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, but the
territorial ambiguity in the wording of both these resolutions (as discussed above)
will further complicate these negotiations. All Israeli territorial practices strongly
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Cairo Agreement's Territorial Map
for the Jericho Area, May 1994
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suggest that Israel will not accept any future territorial solution based on the lines
defined by the 1947 U.N. partition resolution, or the annistice lines of 1949-1950.
Main Problems of Citizenship and Political Representation
One of the most important issues any future Palestinian state will need to
resolve is that of citizenship. Although the PLO is demanding a state within the
geographic limits of the West Bank and Gaza,41 the Palestinian population there
is less than one third of the total worldwide Palestinian population. The majority
of Palestinian live as refugees in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon and cannot be
ignored in any future political solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict (see Tables 2 &
3).

The 1988 symbolic Declaration of Independence of the State of Palestine
called for the creation of a state for "all Palestinians, wherever they may be." The
fulfillment of this declaration would involve the granting of the right of return to
the thousands of Palestinian refugees displaced from Palestine as a result of the
1948 and 1967 wars. The PLO-Israeli DOP, however, delays any negotiations of
the fate of the 1948 refugees to final-status talks that are supposed to start in
May of 1996. While the DOP does provide a framework for discussing the status
of Palestinians displaced in the 1967 war, it does not use the term "refugees" to
41 Prior to the 1988 session of the Palestine National Council meeting in Algiers,
in which the PLO accepted a two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the PLO
declared aim was the establishment of a "secular democratic state" in all of the territory of
Palestine. To achieve that goal the Palestine National Charter stated that "Armed struggle is
the only way to liberate Palestine. This is the overall strategy, not merely a tactical phase .
. . The liberation of Palestine, from an Arab viewpoint, is a national (qawmi) duty and it
attempts to repel the Zionist and imperialist aggression against the Arab homeland, and
aims at the liquidation of the Zionist presence in Palestine" (Article 9 & 15). In 1974, the
PLO modified its goal by presenting a ten-point "phased program" which called for the
establishment of a Palestinian state on any territory liberated from Israel (Hilal 1993, p.
49).
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Table 2
Global Distribution of Estimated Current and
Projected Numbers of the Palestinian People
(1986, 1990/91, and 2000)
Country

1986

1990/91

1995

2000

1,398,050

1,824,179

2,170,101

2,596,986

West Bank/East
Jerusalem

951,250

1,075,531

1,227,545

1,383,415

Gaza

545,100

622,016

726,832

837,699

Israel

608,200

730,000

800,755

919,453

Lebanon

271,434

331,757

392,315

463,067

Syria

242,474

301,744

357,881

410,599

Remaining
Arab States

582,894

445,195

516,724

599,389

Rest of World

280,846

450,000

500,000

550,000

4,880,518

5,780,422

6,692,153

7,760,608

Jordan

Total

Source: Zureik (1994, p. 6).
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Table 3
Numbers of the Palestinian People
Refugee/Displaced and Non-Refugee Status
(1990/91)
Region

Refugee/Displaced

Non-Refugee

Total

Jordan

1,824,179

-------

1,824,179

West Bank

430,083

645,448

1,075,531

Gaza

528,684

93,332

622,016

Israel

150,000

580,000

730,000

Lebanon

331,757

-------

331,757

Syria

301,744

-------

301,744

Remaining Arab
States

445,195

-------

445,195

Rest of World

450,000

-------

450,000

4,461,642

1,318,780

5,780,422

Total
Source: Zureik (1994, p. 6).
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refer to them. By using the term "displaced persons" instead of "refugees" the
DOP may undermine the right of the 1967 refugees to membership in any future
Palestinian entity.42 Article XII of the DOP states that Israel and the PLO:
will invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in
establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the
Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives, on the one hand,
and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt, on the other hand, to promote
cooperation between them. These arrangements will include the
constitution of a Continuing Committee that will decide by agreement
on the modalities of the admission of persons displaced from the West
Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to
prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern will
be dealt with by this Committee. (emphasis added)43
The quadripartite committee mentioned by Article XII of the DOP met for
the first time in Amman, Jordan on March 7, 1995. This meeting underscored the
major differences between the Israeli and Palestinian positions on the 1967
refugees and on the refugee problem in general. The two sides disagreed on a
number of issues including: the criteria defining "displaced persons," their actual
numbers, their international legal status including the right of return, an
acceptable timetable for resolving the issue, and Israeli "security needs."
Palestinians estimate the number of the 1967 "displaced persons" to be a little

42 The use of the wording "displaced persons" instead of "refugees" stem from
Israeli refusal to recognize the international legal status of Palestinian refugees as specified
by successive UN resolutions especially UN Security Council Resolutions 194 and 273.
43 This article in the DOP was copied almost word for word from the 1979 Camp
David Agreement. Clause ill in the Camp David Agreement reads: "During the transitional
period, the representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the self-governing authority will
constitute a Continuing Committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission
of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary
measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern may also
be dealt with by this committee."
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over 800,000. Israelis put the number between 200,000 to 220,000. Palestinian
chief negotiator Nabil Sha'ath argued that "those who were outside Palestine
when the 1967 war broke out and could not return due to war are entitled to
repatriation." He also argued that "those who left after the 1967 war and were
registered in the civil status records prior to 1967 and could not come back for
one reason or another, particularly due to the Israeli authority's intransigence"
should be entitled to repatriation ("Amman Meeting" 1995). Sha'ath also
petitioned for a quick return of 1967 refugees within the framework of the
transitional period. A speedy repatriation of refugees, he said, is needed to help
revive a "peace process that is suffering from a dangerous paralysis" (Haberman
1995, p. 3). Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, by contrast, argued that Israeli
security should be the most important element in the refugee talks because a
speedy return of "displaced persons" could spark unrest (Mideast Mirror, March
9, 1995).
Israel remains strongly opposed to the repatriation of the 1948 Palestinian
refugees, and refuses to admit any responsibility for creating the refugee problem
in the first place.44 Israel continues to reject U.N. Resolution 194 (III) of
December 1948 which stipulates that Palestinian refugees "wishing to return to
their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted do so at
the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the
property of those choosing not to return." The final-status negotiations on this

44 In his opening statement to the second meeting of the Refugee Working Group
of the multilateral peace talks of the Madrid Peace Conference, in November 1992, the
head of the Israeli delegation called the proposition that the "Palestinian refugee problem
[was] the result of mass expulsion" is nothing more than a "travesty" (Zureik 1994, p. 12).
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issue are expected to be highly complicated and certainly protracted. Israel's ban
of the return of the 1948 refugees will probably extend well beyond the end of
the 5-year transitional period, and maybe indefinitely.
The unresolved refugee problem complicates the issue of Palestinian
citizenship, since the PLO, Israel's sole Palestinian negotiating partner, claims to
represent all Palestinians, whether inside or outside the occupied territories. In
fact, all of the PLO leadership, including Yaser Arafat and the most of the
Palestinian negotiating team, are from the Diaspora, not from the West Bank or
Gaza, i.e, they are refugees themselves. Salam (1994) argues that failure to
adequately address the refugee problem will "threaten the legitimacy of the new
[Palestinian] regime and raise doubts about its representativity of all
Palestinians" (p. 22). On the other hand, it is important to note that there are
close to 800,000 Palestinians who live inside Israel and are considered "Israeli
citizens." It is unclear if the creation of a Palestinian state would potentially
affect their status, or if some of them might wish to obtain dual citizenship.
Another major problem facing the creation of a Palestinian state is the issue
of political representation. At the 1974 Arab Summit in Rabat, the Arab League
declared the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian
people." By the beginning of the 1990s and as a result of the dramatic events of
the Palestinian lntifadah the PLO's claim to be the "sole representative of the
Palestinian people" was being challenged by a growing Islamic movement in the
region, especially from the Hamas and the Islamic Jihad movements. These two
organizations vigorously reject all of the peace agreements between the PLO and
Israel and consider them nonbinding on the Palestinian people. The two
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organizations have publicly condemned the recent Oslo Agreement and have
vowed to wreck it.
A collection of Palestinian secular forces, mainly the Popular front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (DFLP), have also expressed their opposition, not to the PLO per se, but
to the current PLO leadership's (i.e., Arafat and his Fatah movement) style of
handling the peace talks with Israel.45 These secular forces reject the PLO-Israeli
DOP and Cairo Agreements because they see in them a retreat from the
"inalienable rights of the Palestinian people," affirmed by many United Nations
resolutions, especially General Assembly Resolution 3236 (XXIX).46 In February
1995, several secular forces formed a political opposition front under the name of
Al Tajammu' Al-Filastini (Palestinian Grouping). In its first public statement this
group outlined its reasons for opposing the DOP:
The Oslo Agreement [DOP] was nothing but a bottleneck into which the
Palestine question was pushed to beleaguer the Palestinian people and
bring them to their knees. The agreement was nothing but a logical result
of the policy of relinquishment adopted by the leadership dominating the
PLO. Results that have surfaced now clearly emphasize that the
agreement was simply intended to serve Zionist interests at the expense of
inalienable Palestinian rights. The Oslo Agreement was the result of the
policy of single-handedness and disregard for the PLO's representative
bodies. Before and after the Madrid conference, the [PLO's] domineering
45 In 1991, several Islamic and secular Palestinian opposition groups formed a
loose political front against the Madrid Peace Conference. This front is usually referred to
as the "Ten Factions."
46 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3236 (XXIX) of 1974 "l.
Reaffirms the inalienable right of the Palestinian people in Palestine, including: (a) The
right to self-determination without external interference; (b) the right to national
independence and sovereignty; 2. Reaffirms also the inalienable right of the Palestinian to
return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted, and
calls for their return" (Zureik 1994, p. 9).
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leadership decisions deviated from the Palestinian National Charter in a
way that contradicted the decisions of national councils and other
representative bodies. It has become clear that, even if we presume that
the single-handed policy is adopted in good faith, it cannot but lead to dire
and gloomy consequences. The Oslo Agreement was signed even without
the closest individuals to the domineering leadership ... Logic stipulates
that Yaser Arafat should admit his utter failure and submit his resignation.
The Palestinian Grouping believes that the alternative to the failing
leadership policies is to refer the issue to the people because they are able
to take control of things and restore the pan-Arab, Islamic and humane
dimensions and depth to the Palestine question. ("New Palestinian
Group" 1995)
The PLO faces formidable political challenges. On November 18, 1994, a
clash between the Palestinian Authority police and the supporters of the Hamas
movement in Gaza resulted in 12 fatalities and close to a hundred injuries. Many
fear that future tension between the Palestinian Authority and the Islamic
movement could lead to a "Palestinian civil war." The secular opposition to the
PLO/PA, however, remains political and not militant in nature.
Jamil Hilal (1994), director of the PLO Information Department, and
member of the Palestine National Council since 1983, believes that in order for the
PLO to survive as a credible and legitimate representative of the Palestinian
people it must:
demonstrate to the Palestinians in the occupied territories that it can create
from the September [Oslo] agreement the necessary conditions to build an
independent state in these areas; it will have to demonstrate to the
agreement's opponents its fidelity to democratic principals of government;
and it will have to show the Palestinian of the Diaspora that their rights
and interests will not be ignored. In other words, the PLO leadership must
prove that it is still able to represent, defend, and further the interests,
aspirations, and rights of the entire Palestinian people, and not just a
portion of them. (p. 46)
The nature of the DOP-proposed elections will certainly influence, if not
determine, the shape of Palestinian political representation in the transitional
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period. So far Hamas and the Islamic Jihad oppose these future elections. Hamas,
however, did not completely rule out its participation. Abu-Amr (1995) argues
that "Hamas supports the idea of elections in principal, provided they are
legislative and not explicitly linked to the Oslo Agreement. Hamas is also keen on
elections to establish its strength through a popular vote and may participate
precisely for that purpose without necessarily agreeing to participate in the
elected council" (p. 46).
The proposed elections are going to be problematic for another reason.
Israel's demands to have the final say in determining the nature and scope of
these elections make it more difficult to convince Palestinians who oppose the
Oslo Agreement, whether secular or Islamist, that the elections will be "free and
democratic." Article VII of the DOP states that:
The Interim Agreement shall specify, among other things, the structure of
the Council, the number of its members, and the transfer of powers and
responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its Civil
Administration to the Council. The Interim Agreement shall also specify
the Council's executive authority, legislative authority in accordance with
Article IX below, and the independent Palestinian judicial organs.
In addition to the provision of this Article, Israel will have a say in the way
the "system of elections" is designed, the nature of international supervision, and
the rules and regulations regarding election campaigning (Annex I). Palestinians
in the opposition charge that these DOP provisions make the proposed elections
look as if they are Israeli and not Palestinian elections!
According to the timetable of the DOP, the elections should have taken
place in July of 1994. As of April 1995, and after eleven rounds of talks, PLO and
Israeli negotiators remain in disagreement over several issues related to the
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elections. This disagreement came mostly from divergent Israeli and Palestinians
interpretations of the DOP on the following issues: (1) the PLO is calling for a
100-member legislative council, the Israelis for a 24-member council with only
executive powers specified by Israel, (2) the PLO wants full participation of East
Jerusalem Palestinians in the election process, including the right to vote and run
as candidates, the Israelis want to restrict that participation to voting only, and (3)
the PLO says any one of legal age regardless of political views have the right to
participate, Israel objects to the participation of any one who publicly oppose the
"peace process."
The elections are also expected to face major technical problems. The
population characteristics in the occupied territories are highly complex. The
presence of large numbers of refugee camps both in the West Bank and Gaza will
inevitably complicate the districting process. The absence of an official census of
the local Palestinian population is another complication. In a March 1995
interview, Professor Sa'ib Urayqat, Minister of Local Government in the
Palestinian Authority and head of the Palestinian negotiating team on elections,
stated that more than 50 per cent of the population records Israel provided the
PLO had errors. Names were in Hebrew, not in Arabic, requiring the Palestinian
side to conduct an extensive review of the voter lists.47 Urayqat suggested that
the final voter list will include about 1.2 million Palestinians who are 17 years and
older ("Palestinian-Israeli Talks" 1995).

47 The PLO employed 5000 Palestinian teachers to accomplish this task.
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Problems associated with Palestinian citizenship and political representation, are
likely to occur in all phases of the process of Palestinian state formation. The
PLO-Israeli DOP does not offer any tangible solutions to these problems. In order
for the PLO to survive it must be able to balance the demands of the "outside"
and the "inside" Palestinian communities, i.e., those of the occupied territories
and those of the Diaspora. Also, the relationship between the Palestine National
Council (the PLO parliament in exile) and any future autonomy council in the
occupied territories must be adequately defined. On the other hand, for the future
autonomy elections to succeed and be recognized as legitimate, they must be free
and democratic. If the Palestinian political opposition, does not participate (either
by choice or restriction) in the autonomy elections, the peace process of the Oslo
Agreement is likely to collapse.
Main Economic Problems
Israel's military and economic practices in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
create major obstacles to the development of a viable and independent
Palestinian economy, and in turn to the political stability of any future Palestinian
entity in those areas. The Israeli military occupation produced an asymmetry of
economic relations between the Palestinian and Israeli economies. Since 1967
Israeli economic and territorial practices has kept the Palestinian economy in a
state of underdevelopment and subservience to the Israeli economy. Today, the
Palestinian economy is effectively "captured" by the more powerful Israeli
economy.48
48 For a more elaborate discussion of the concept of the "captured" economy and
the effects of Israeli military occupation on the economy of the West Bank and Gaza see
Abed (1988; 1990); and Samara (1987; 1990; 1992).
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The economic asymmetry between Israel and the Occupied Palestinian
Territories (OPT) is reflected in the wide disparity in both the per capita income
and the Gross National Products of the two economies. In 1991 Israeli Gross
National Product (GNP) was about $59 billion U.S. Dollars which is about 30
times that of the OPT.49 Israel per capita income was $10,900 while that of the
West Bank was about $1,200 and that of Gaza about $700. The asymmetry is
also present in the export-import relationship between the two economies. Here,
the evidence that Israel treats the OPT as a "captured" market becomes more
pronounced. For example, in 1987, over 90.9% of the West Bank imports and
92.3% of Gaza Strip imports came from or through Israel (PASSIA 1993, p. 164).
The Israeli military government used its control over licensing to thwart
industrial development in the OPT as seen in the repeated refusal to grant permits
to Palestinian industrialist to establish factories. Industrialization in the OPT was
also hindered by inadequate infrastructure and services, high land prices
influenced by Israeli confiscation of land and complex zoning restrictions (Elmusa
and EI-Jaafari 1995; Samara and Shahadah,1988).
The retardation of the Palestinian economy has forced a large number of
Palestinian workers to seek jobs in Israel. The Palestinian workforce became
Israel's prime source of cheap labor. In 1988, the total number of Palestinian
workers in Israel was estimated at 130,000. About 35% of the West Bank labor
force and about 46% of the Gazan labor force worked in Israel. However, these
numbers dropped dramatically after March 1993 as a result of an Israeli policy of

49 All money figures cited in this thesis are in U.S. dollars based on the appropriate
exchange value at the time indicated by each citation.
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prolonged closure (sealing oft) of the occupied territories. The closure policy bars
Palestinian workers from jobs in Israel as a form of collective punishment for acts
of violence against Israelis. By the beginning of 1995, the repeated security
closures of the West Bank and Gaza Strip brought the Palestinian economy to a
point near collapse. Palestinian unemployment reached record levels totaling
47% in the West Bank and 58% in Gaza (Rosenfeld 1995, p. 2). The situation is
aggravated by Israeli attempts to replace Palestinian workers with foreign
workers from Eastern Europe and South East Asia. By February 1995, Israel has
imported close to 65,000 laborers from abroad, mostly from Thailand and Romania

(The Independent, February 27, 1995).
The Oslo Agreement between Israel and the PLO ignored the historical
process that led to the creation of the current economic realities. Although nearly
two-thirds of the Agreement consisted of Articles and protocols calling for
Israeli-Palestinian "economic cooperation" in local and regional development,
many leading Palestinian economists fear that "economic cooperation" at this
stage in history is no more than softer semantics for continued Palestinian
economic dependence on Israel. In an interview with Middle East Report, Samir
llleileh (1994), the head of the Economic Development Group in Jerusalem, and
the designated Palestinian Liaison with the World Bank put it boldly:
The economic protocols are the price we had to pay for the [Oslo]
agreement ... I thought it was premature to speak about cooperation in all
these aspects and specific joint-venture kinds of work before we solve
basic political problems. If Jerusalem, refugees, borders, security and other
issues are not addressed, then why are we talking about economic
protocols? (p. 7)
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In another interview with Middle East Report, Salah Abdul Shafi (1994),
Director of the Economic Development Group in Gaza, provided a detailed
analysis of the economic repercussions of the Oslo Agreement, especially for the
Gaza Strip. Mr. Abdul Shafi believes that "The agreement means that the
incorporation of the Strip's economy in Israel's will be formalized and solidified"
(p. 11 ). He also believes that the accord echoes and complements the new Israeli
economic policies vis-a-vis Gaza engineered by Israeli economist Ezra Sadan after
the 1991 Gulf War. Abdul Shafi said that Sadan advocated the establishment of
"Industrial Parks" in the Gaza Strip modeled after ones in Taiwan and Mexico,
and proposed that Gaza's "traditional agriculture" should be replaced by a more
"industrialized agriculture."
Abdul Shafi maintains that the current kind of dependency characterized
by the "daily migration" of Palestinian labor to Israel will be replaced by a "new
vehicle for incorporation" based on "a system of subcontracting between
Palestinian capital and sectors of Israeli capital." "With the Declaration of
Principles", he added, "we [Palestinians] will be working for Israel in Gaza

rather than in Tel Aviv, but we will be working for them nonetheless" (p. 12,
emphasis added). Finally, Abdul Shafi summed his interpretation of the Oslo
Agreement in the following dramatic statement:
You see the problem. By accepting Gaza-Jericho First the PLO has given
up any notion of developing a genuinely independent Palestinian
economic sector ... You don't sign a document like this if you're serious
about economic self-determination. (p. 13)
Many Israeli leftist have also presented similar economic interpretations of
the Oslo Agreement. For example, Shlomo Avineri (1994), Professor of political
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science at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and former Director-General of
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, argues that "economic cooperation" between
Israel and the "evolving Palestinian entity" will inevitably result in a "new mode
of dependency;" a perpetuation of the kind of unequal and uneven relationship
that has developed during the 28-year old Israeli occupation. A vineri insists that
in order for a healthy economic relationship to exist between Israel and the
Palestinians, the Palestinian economy should be given ample time to heal and
develop in relative separation from the Israeli economy.
However, it is unlikely that Israel will let the Palestinians develop a
genuinely independent economy free from Israeli domination. The economic
arrangements proposed by the Oslo and Cairo Agreements reinforce Palestinian
economic dependency on Israel. For example, the Oslo Agreement allows
Palestinians only to levy an income tax, but all forms of indirect taxation (value
added taxes (VAT), customs, and fees) will continue to be levied by Israel. Many
Palestinian economists argue that any autonomous Palestinian entity will find it
extremely difficult to create an independent foreign trade policy if Palestinians do
not have their own customs and tariffs; they maintain that Palestinian "natural
trading partners are in Eastern Europe, Asia, and the Arab World," not with Israel
and its trading partners. They also believe that to stay in a "custom union" with
Israel will leave Palestinians powerless to form their own macro-economic policy
(West 1994). The logic of proposing economic cooperation between unequal
parties; between the occupier and the occupied, without ending military
occupation and before Palestinians gain their political rights is at least
problematic.
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The Oslo and Cairo Agreements do not mention the fate of the confiscated
Palestinian lands. It is unclear how the Palestinians will embark on a process of
true economic development if they do not have control over this valuable
resource--It is estimated that Israel has already confiscated 65% of the area of the
West Bank and 40% of Gaza (PASSIA, p. 176). The importance of land stems
from the prominence of agriculture in the Palestinian economy. Agriculture
makes up to 24% of the GNP of the OPT, absorbs 23% of the OPT labor force,
and accounts for 60% of OPT exports ("Israel: Peace, Harvard Style," 1993).
Moreover, the Oslo Agreement did not revoke the more than 1,400 Israeli military
orders in effect in the occupied territories, most of which are serious obstacles to
Palestinian socioeconomic development (JMCC 1992).
The Oslo and Cairo Agreements bypassed the economic role of the
Palestinian grassroots organizations,50 they did not even acknowledge them.
These organizations have been instrumental in socioeconomic development of
the OPT during the Intifadah, and they have been the source of empowerment for
many economically disadvantaged Palestinians. Many of these grassroots
organizations focused especially on empowering Palestinian women in the OPT.
Bypassing these organizations and replacing them with bur~aucratic Palestinian
and joint Palestinian-Israeli committees could result in the distortion of the
bottom-up Palestinian approach to economic development that started to take
shape during the Palestinian uprising.

50 These organizations include the popular agricultural and women's committees

that were involved in hundreds of self-help and small-scale production projects in several
villages and refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
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Neither the Oslo nor the Cairo Agreements made any provision for
compensating Palestinians for the heavy tax burden put on them since 1967.
Although the issue of compensation was brought up many times by top PLO
officials in international conferences, and by Palestinian delegates to the
Washington peace negotiations, it was completely ignored in the Oslo
Agreement.SI In an economic conference in Gaza on December 29, 1993, several
Palestinian economist criticized the PLO for failing to demand for economic
compensation from Israel. They argued that the taxes levied on Palestinians over
the years had not been reinvested in the occupied territories52 ("Conference Held
on 'Challenges' to Gaza Economy" 1993).
Finally, the agreements are vague in dealing with the important remaining
issues of Jewish settlements in the OPT, the fate of Palestinian refugees, the status
of Jerusalem, and the review of exiting military orders. These issues and the way
they are treated will have major repercussions on the economic viability of any
future Palestinian polity.
As the above discussion demonstrates the Oslo and Cairo Agreements do
not constitute an adequate foundation for the development of an independent
Palestinian economy. The two agreements were signed at a time of rapid
Palestinian economic disintegration, but failed to offer any practical remedies for
51 For e.g., the issue of compensation was raised by Jawid Ghossein, Chairman of
the Palestine National Fund of the PLO, in a speech at the Economics of Middle East Peace
Conference sponsored by Middle East Economic Digest (MEED), Middle East Economic
Digest, January 17, 1993.

52 For more details about the illegal use of taxation by the Israeli military authorities

in the OPT see Hadara Lazar's (1990): The system of Taxation in the West Bank an the
Gaza Strip: As an Instrument for the Enforcement of Authority During the Uprising.
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the Palestinian economic predicament. The continuation of Palestinian economic
dependence on Israel will certainly weaken the Palestinian ability to achieve
political independence. For Palestinians to succeed in building an independent
and viable state, the current unequal and asymmetrical economic relation with
Israel must be changed and restructured on more equitable terms.
Main Problems of State Apparatus
To maintain its viability and legitimacy, a state must perform a set of
essential functions that ensure the reproduction and maintenance of society. A
modem state is expected to provide a wide range of public goods and services,
facilitate and mange the economy, and meditate conflict between the different
groups and interests within society. Thus, if a future Palestinian entity is to
qualify as a state, it must build appropriate institutions and apparatuses capable of
performing these functions.
There are major problems and obstacles that will either complicate or
prevent the Palestinian Authority53 and the future autonomy council from
performing the civic functions of a state over the interim 5-year period. To
establish its viability as a pre-state entity, the Palestinian Authority must be to
able deal with the immense socioeconomic problems caused by the prolonged
Israeli military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. These problems include a
devastated Palestinian economy and infrastructure, severe environmental and

53 The Palestinian Authority is a 24-member assembly that was appointed by PLO

Chairman Y aser Arafat, in May of 1994, to handle "autonomy" affairs in parts of the Gaza
strip and the West Bank city of Jericho, pending the election of the Palestinian Autonomy
Council.
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health problems, undeveloped civil institutions, and a chaotic political situation
marked by sectarianism and ideological factionalism (Roy 1993; 1994).
In spite of these problems the Palestinian Authority must be able to
provide a long list of public goods and services: water and electricity, sewage
disposal, telephone services, health facilities, education, independent legal and
regulatory agencies, police protection, etc. The PLO is trying to build quasi-state
institution over the 5-year interim period that will serve as a nuclei for the
development of future state institutions (see Table 4).
Israel, however, still retains effective control over the provision of many
basic services in the West Bank and. Gaza including water (Israeli Mekoroth
Company), electric power generation and distribution (Israel Electric Company),
telephone services (Israeli Bezek Company), and postal services. Control of these
services is a direct way for Israel to assert its sovereignty over the occupied
territories. By preventing the Palestinian Authority from providing these essential
services, Israel deprives it of important symbols of sovereignty. Continued Israeli
control of these services forces the Palestinians to stay dependent on Israel and
impedes the drive to Palestinian statehood.
There are several other factors that stand in the way of the Palestinian
Authority,s performance of essential state functions during the interim period.
The Oslo and Cairo Agreements have restricted the jurisdiction of the Palestinian
Authority and the future autonomy council to a degree that may retard the
development of viable state institutions. Most of the preexisting Israeli military
laws remain in force, and will not be changed without Israeli approval. Article VII
(9) of the Cairo Agreement states that "laws and military orders in effect in the

Table 4
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The Palestinian National Authority (PNA)
Ministries
• Ministry of Health
• Ministry of Education
• Ministry of Finance
• Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities
• Ministry of Religious Affairs and Awqaf
• Ministry of Municipalities and Villages Councils
• Ministry of Interior
• Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry
• Ministry of Social Affairs
• Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications
• Ministry of Public Works
• Ministry of Housing
• Ministry of Agriculture and Environment
• Ministry of Energy and Natural resources
• Ministry of Communication and Transportation
• Ministry of Information
• Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training
• Ministry of Culture and Arts
• Ministry of Ministry of Justice
• Ministry of Youth and Sports
• Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation
• Ministry of Expatriates

Departments
• Accountancy Office and Financial and Administrative Control Department
• Survey and Land Department
• Employees and Civil Service Department
• Economic Policies Research Institute
• The Palestinian Economic Council for Reconstruction and Development (PECDAR)
• The Palestinian Monetary Authority
• The Palestinian Statistics Center

Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, Summer 1994, 23(4): pp. 145-146.
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Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area prior to the signing of this Agreement shall
remain in force, unless amended or abrogated in accordance with this
agreement."54 By agreeing to such a provision the PLO in effect has consented,
although not explicitly, to the continuation of the Israeli military occupation
during the interim period. Indeed, the persistence of Israeli military occupation of
the West Bank and Gaza makes the development of viable Palestinian state
apparatuses a daunting task. There is a justifiable Palestinian fear that further
delay in revoking Israeli military laws could result in changing their status from de
facto to de jure by instituting them gradually in the arrangements for the Interim

period. Many of the more than 1,400 Israeli military laws in effect in the occupied
territories will complicate the Palestinian Authority's ability to perform its civic
duties during the interim period.
The Palestinian Authority also faces a fiscal crisis. The current economic
situation makes it extremely difficult for the Palestinian Authority to raise
sufficient revenue·to cover its operating costs. Also the money promised by
international donors to support the Palestinian autonomy has not been sufficient
to deal with the problems at hand. A sum of 2.4 billion dollars has been pledged
by forty countries to be dispersed over the five-year interim period. However,
many of the International donors have not lived up to their promises. Of the
$760 million of designated aid for 1994, only $70 million has been provided to
the Palestinian Authority. Even if the $2.4 billion aid package that the
Palestinian Authority is supposed to get is received, it is unclear if it is enough to

54 The Cairo Agreement did not, explicitly, "amended or abrogated" any of these
military laws.
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revitalize the devastated Palestinian economy, build decent housing for the tens
of thousands of Palestinian refugees, finance the administrative costs of
autonomy, and meet the other financial needs of the Interim Palestinian Authority
and its various institutions.
The Palestinian Authority's ability to perform the civic functions of the
state is currently hampered by an over emphasis on police power. The Oslo and
Cairo Agreements allowed the PLO to bring in a 7 ,000-strong police force55 to
"guarantee public order and internal security" in parts of Gaza, Jericho, and
[later] in the rest of the West Bank (Article VIII of the DOP). This police force is
expected to prevent armed resistance to Israeli military occupation. In fact, Israel
is demanding that the PLO use this police force to disarm the Islamic movement in
Gaza (i.e., Hamas and the Islamic Jihad) and any other militant Palestinian group
opposed to peace with Israel. Most of the money received from international
donors in 1994 was spent on salaries for the five security apparatuses of the PLO
police-force. This overemphasis on police power may retard the process of
institution-building and raise doubt about the Palestinian Authority's legitimacy
in the interim period. Abu-Amr (1994) has described the PLO predicament as
follows:
For more than two decades the PLO leadership has developed a style of
work based on the logic of "revolution" and the Diaspora, a logic that
may be totally different from the logic of "state-building" and civil
society. Reconciling the two logics, especially in the transitional phase,
poses a great challenge: many have doubts about the extent to which the
PLO leadership will be able to adapt to a new situation. (p. 80)

55 This police force is mad up mainly of former PLO guerrilla fighters who
survived the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and from members of the Palestine
Liberation Army which is under the control of the Jordanian Army.
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In October 1994, an opinion poll conducted by the Center for Palestine
Research and Studies found that only 31 % of Palestinians in the West Bank and
Gaza are satisfied with the Palestinian Authority's performance thus far. Many
Palestinians have accused the Palestinian Authority of practicing "favoritism and
nepotism" and claim that supporters of Fatah (Yaser Arafat's group) have
received the "lion's share" of appointments to the new agencies and
departments. Abu-Amr (1995) believes that such appointments have taken a
serious toll on the Palestinian Authority's efficiency:
Institutions, it is said, are being established without sufficient preparation.
Reinforcing the effects of inadequately qualified cadres is the superfluity
of many appointments: It is said that a number of departments and
agencies have been transformed into havens for disguised unemployment.
(pp. 41-42)
It is important to remember that the current Palestinian Authority was not
elected, but was appointed by the PLO pending the election of the Autonomy
Council. No matter what shape this future Council takes, the challenges will
remain the same: to build viable state institutions and perform their functions all at
the same time. Whether this can be done within the context of the 5-year interim
period, and with all of the present Israeli restrictions in place is indeed
questionable.
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CHAPTER4
PROSPECTS AND CONCLUSIONS
The road to a Palestinian state can be best described as passing through a
minefield of problems and obstacles. If these problems are not adequately
resolved, an independent and viable Palestinian state is unlikely to be
established.56 This thesis focused on problems associated with the following: (1)
the definition and delimitations of a Palestinian national territory, (2) the
determination of Palestinian citizenship and political representation, (3) the ability
to create a functioning Palestinian economy, and (4) the development of a viable
Palestinian state apparatus.
A detailed examination of the Oslo and Cairo Agreements between the
PLO and Israel reveals their inadequacy in resolving the principal territorial,
political, and economic obstacles to Palestinian independence. The two
agreements do not end Israeli military occupation; do not halt the building of
Israeli settlements nor the confiscation of more Palestinian lands. They ignore
Palestinian human rights; delay the discussion of the Palestinian refugee problem
and the status of the city Jerusalem.57 Finally, many observers believe that a
·solution to this conflict will require international support and assurances. The

56 To use the terminology of Hartshorne (1950), a Palestinian state can be created
only if "centripetal forces" overcome "centrifugal forces" (see Chapter 2).

57 Palestinians consider Jerusalem as their political, cultural, and religious center,
and the capital of any future Palestinian state. Therefore, they consider the political future
of Jerusalem as the epicenter of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, an issue that can make or
break the peace process. If Israeli position and actions regarding the status of the city is not
changed, the peace process will inevitably collapse.
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Oslo and Cairo Agreements did not incorporate any such role for the international
community.
Many critics of the PLO-Israel peace process argue that the Oslo and Cairo
Agreements are in themselves obstacles. For example, Edward Said (1994)
contends that:
by accepting that land and sovereignty are being postponed till 'final
status negotiations,' the Palestinians have in effect, discounted their
unilateral and internationally acknowledged claim to the West Bank and
Gaza: these have now become, in effect, 'disputed territories.' Thus, with
Palestinian assistance, Israel has been awarded at least an equal claim to
them. (p. xxxvii)
Said's (1994) argument is indeed substantiated by the views expressed by
Joel Singer (1994), the Legal Adviser of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and
who is largely responsible for drafting the Oslo Declaration of Principles (DOP):
As its title suggests, the DOP is not a comprehensive agreement, but rather
a statement of agreed principles. In other words, it is not a self-executing
document which purports to set out practical arrangements, but rather an
"agreement to reach agreement," which leaves the details to be negotiated
between the parties. (p. 2)
Indeed, this "agreement to reach agreement" has no clear terms of
reference. Except for U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which do
not explicitly mention the Palestinians, the DOP, in effect, renders all other U.N.
resolutions affirming the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people both
negotiable and disputable.
If one compares the DOP with the Palestinian proposal for autonomy
arrangements presented to Israel by the Palestinian delegation to the peace talks,
on January 14, 1992, one finds that the DOP constitutes a major departure from
Palestinian vision of how autonomy should be structured. Unlike the 1992

85
Palestinian document, the DOP has no mention of international law or legality; no
mention of implementing the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention of
1949, the Hague Regulations of 1907, and the relevant U.N. resolutions on the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
The DOP' s disregard of international legality can seriously affect the
prospects of creating a Palestinian state. In fact, Joel Singer (1994), the Israeli
architect of the DOP, makes it clear that the negotiated accord preserves the
Israeli military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza throughout the interim
period:
The dissolution of the Israeli Civil Administration will have no impact on
the status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Civil Administration was
created in the early 1980's as an organ of the Israeli military government in
order to discharge the powers and responsibilities of the military
government in civilian matters. It should be noted that, prior to the
establishment of the Civil Administration, the military government itself
had been performing both civilian and non-civilian functions. Thus, with
the dissolution of the Civil Administration, the military government will
simply resume all the powers and responsibilities of the Civil
Administration not transferred to the Palestinian Council. In this context,
the fact that the military government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip will
continue to exist is very significant. It emphasizes that, notwithstanding
the transfer of a large portion of the powers and responsibilities currently
exercised by Israel to Palestinian hands, the status of the West Bank and
Gaza Strip will not be changed during the interim period. These areas will
continue to be subject to military government. Similarly, the continued
existence of the military government indicates that the Palestinian
Council will not be independent or sovereign in nature, but rather will
be legally subordinate to the authority of the military government. In
other words, operating within Israel, the military government will continue
to be the source of authority for the Palestinian Council and the powers
and responsibilities exercised by it in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. (p. 4,
emphasis added)
Thus, the Palestinian autonomy arrangements proposed by the DOP are
not consistent with the features of an Independent state and, if not radically
changed, are not likely to lead to one either. The fact that Palestinians were not
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able to obtain better terms in the negotiations reflects the uneven balance of
power between Israel and the PLO. Israel is a major economic and military power
in the region and has not been compelled to make concessions. Moreover, Israel
enjoys the military, economic, and political support of the United States (U.S.),
and, so far, American governments have not pressured Israel to accept the
creation of a Palestinian state. In fact, all U.S. administrations, without exception,
have declared their opposition to the creation of a Palestinian state as a final
outcome of negotiations. With the absence of any real pressure, Israel is likely to
continue "creating facts on the ground": building more settlements to assert its
sovereignty over Jerusalem, erase the "Green line," and fragment the occupied
territories.
Andoni (1993) argues that the PLO, in negotiating a separate peace with
Israel with minimum coordination and support of other Arab states, could
undermine its "bargaining position" for the creation of an Independent
Palestinian state at later stages of peace negotiations. He maintains that the
PLO-Israel deal could initiate a "premature process of normalization" between
Israel and other Arab states which could leave the Palestinians in a weaker
position at the final status negotiations.
By normalizing relations with Arab states, Israel can gain enormous
economic advantages as new markets are opened for Israeli products. And on the
broader regional level, Israel can gain from normalizing relations with other
Islamic countries (e.g., new Islamic Republics of the former Soviet Union) as well
as non-Arab African countries (which previously opposed diplomatic relations
with Israel due to Arab pressure). Many of these countries can serve as potential
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markets, especially for Israeli high-tech and military products. All this can occur
before there is any tangible change in the living conditions of Palestinians in the
occupied territories and in the Diaspora (Bennis 1993).
Taking the harsh economic realities in the occupied territories into
consideration, the proposed $2.4 billion dollars of economic aid for Palestinian
autonomy over the five-year interim period will be a "drop in a bucket.,,
Compared to the money that Israel gets from the U.S. alone, the aid to the
Palestinians is meager indeed. From 1995 to 2000, Israel is scheduled to receive
between $15 and $20 billion in military and economic grants from the U.S. These
grants include $2 billion for Israel,s new combat aircraft and $6 billion of the
remaining $10 billion in loan guarantees that Israel got in 1991 to help settle the
Russian Jews (Collins 1994, p. 17). It is doubtful that $2.4 billion dollars in aid is
enough to offset the adverse economic effects of the previous 28 years of Israeli
military occupation.
One important question is who are the main economic beneficiaries of the
current PLO-Israeli peace process? Several Palestinian economists, including
Salah Abdul Shafi (1994), believe that the people who stand to gain most are the
local rich Palestinians living in the occupied territories (whose economic interests
are tied directly to different sectors of Israeli capital), rich Palestinian investors
from Jordan and the Gulf States, and foreign multinational corporations (which
have already acquired the lion-share of contracts for several "developmenf,
projects in Gaza and Jericho to be financed from the $ 2.4 billion of international
aid).
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Another important question is: if current political and economic trends and
relationships continue what form might the future Palestinian polity take? Many
analysts have proposed different scenarios as outcomes of the current peace
process. One scenario is suggested by Amos Perlmutter (1994), professor of
political science at the American University and editor of the Journal of Strategic
Studies. He argues that if the present autonomy deal between Israel and the PLO
ever lead to the creation of a Palestinian state, that state will "likely be
authoritarian, noninclusive and undemocratic." Professor Perlmutter maintains
that the Palestinian polity will fit Samuel Huntington's model of a praetorian
state: a state that has a low level of political institutionalization, that lacks a viable
middle class, and that can only be controlled by a police regime.
A more optimistic picture is painted by William Quandt (1994), a Senior
Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution.
Quandt (1994) maintains that the great majority of Palestinians want democracy.
He cites several recent polls taken in the West Bank and Gaza that showed about
75% of Palestinians there favored holding elections for a governing authority
during the interim period, while only 10% wanted the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) to appoint the government. Quandt (1994) argues that
Palestinians care dearly about democracy because "Palestinians have numerous
stories of their [own] mistreatment by arbitrary, nondemocratic governments.
These memories predispose many Palestinians to think that their own government
should avoid the pitfalls of one-man rule" (p. 3).
Many have suggested that Israel's territorial practices in the West and
Gaza will likely lead to the "cantonization" of the occupied territories and not to
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Palestinian sovereignty. Jansen (1993) argues that Israeli settlement activities will
lead to the creation of four "cantons" where Palestinians will be "grouped" and
restricted to. These cantons are located in northern, central, and southern parts ,of
the West Bank and in East Jerusalem. Likewise, Palestinian strategic studies
expert Ahmad Khalidi (1995) argues that the Israeli Labor Party vision of
"territorial comprise" actually "threatens to undermine the viability of any future
Palestinian entity: severed from its heartland around Jerusalem, reduced wholesale
by 'territorial adjustments' along the Green Line, strewn with pockets of a
long-term residual Israeli military presence, denied the means of self-defense, and
sandwiched between its two significantly more powerful neighbors, Israel and
Jordan, the Palestinian 'state' would ultimately have little to recommend it to the
Palestinian themselves" (pp. 12-13 ).
To many Palestinians, the kind of state is more important than just having a
state. The accumulative effects of problems and obstacle discussed in this thesis
will undoubtly influence the makeup of any future Palestinian polity. American
writer and human rights activists Phyllis Bennis (1993) summed up the potential
political and economic effects of the Oslo Agreement on the substance of any
future Palestinian state:
What underlies some of the Palestinian unease and opposition with the
agreement, is that any state emerging from this process will probably bear
little resemblance to the truly independent democratic Palestine that so .
many fought for. Rather, a Palestinian state created at the end of the 20th
century is likely to be only nominally independent, trapped in a
confederation with Jordan, militarily overwhelmed, economically strangled
by an Israel strengthened by open ties to the Arab world, financially
dominated by the IMF and the World Bank, accountable to U.S. and
Western business interest, and repressive towards domestic opponents. (p.
16)
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The autonomy arrangements of the Oslo and Cairo Agreements forces the
PLO to act as Israel's enforcer in the occupied territories without any guarantees
that such a role will lead to the creation of a Palestinian state. By accepting
limited autonomy in Gaza and Jericho, the PLO will eventually have to subdue,
by physical force if necessary, any serious political opposition against it or against
Israel. Israel, on her part, has made the implementation of the Oslo Agreement
contingent upon the PLO's suppression of the Hamas and Islamic Jihad
movements in Gaza and the West Bank. Many fear that this could lead to a
Palestinian civil war and, eventually, to the collapse of the whole peace process.
The prospects of creating a truly independent and sovereign Palestinian
state at the end of the interim period proposed by the Oslo Agreement are bleak
indeed. After a series of suicide bombings by the Islamic Hamas and Jihad
movements in late 1994 and early 1995, the Israeli government devised a security
separation plan between Israel and the occupied territories. The plan consists of a
defense line made up of fences, electronic sensors, dogs and security patrols. In
the West Bank the separation line will be set up east of the Green Line (the
armistice line of 1949) and will follow the periphery of the major Palestinian
population centers. The security fence that already surrounds the Gaza strip will
be reinforced and fortified (The Independent, March 17, 1995). If this plan is
actually implemented it will result in the incarceration of the whole Palestinian
population. Territorially, this plan will make any future Palestinian polity look
more like an actual prison rather than a state, with Israeli guards both inside and
outside the prison walls.
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The balance of power remains in favor of Israel and Israel remains against
genuine independence for Palestinians. Although more countries recognize the
symbolic Palestinian Declaration of Independence than recognize Israel,
international recognition alone is not sufficient to bring a Palestinian state into
being. A state is not created by wishful thinking or by the moral strength of a just
cause. For Palestine to succeed in obtaining statehood Palestinians must be able
to counter Israeli territorial actions with more effective Palestinian territorial
actions, i.e., Palestinians have to fight Israeli territoriality with a more efficient
Palestinians territoriality;58 Palestinians must use the logic of territoriality to
formulate practical spatial strategies in their struggle for national independence.
As Palestinian Professor Edward Said (1994) eloquently put it:
A general idea like "limited autonomy" might lead to independence or it
might equally well lead to further domination. In either case, the main task
for Palestinians is to know and understand the overall map of the
territories that the Israelis have been creating, and then devise concrete
tactics of resistance. (In the history of colonial invasions, maps are
always first drawn by victors, since maps are always instruments of
conquest; once projected, they are then implemented. Geography
therefore is the art of war but also can be the art of resistance if there is
a counter-map and a counter strategy). (Said 1994, p. 416, emphasis
added)
There are no guarantees that the current peace talks between Israel and
the PLO will lead to the creation of a Palestinian state. The prospects of forming a
Palestinian state will ultimately depend on the outcome of the final status
negotiations between the two sides. For a truly independent Palestinian state to
form, these negotiations must produce an adequate resolution to the problems
58 Robert Sack (1986) defines territoriality as "the attempt by an individual or

group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting
and asserting control over a geographic area" (p. 19). Sack also sees territoriality as an
"indispensable means to power at all levels: from the personal to the international" (p. 1).
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outlined in this thesis. Most of these problems are extremely serious and cannot
be disregarded or easily swept under the carpet.
Overall, the process of Palestinian state formation is indeed not linear.
Dramatic events can push the process forward or backward. However, it is clear
from the events of the past 47 years that as long as Palestinian calls for statehood
are not met, the Middle East will inevitably witness further turmoil and
bloodshed. In 1896, Theodore Hertzl, the "father" of political Zionism, wrote: " ...
The world needs the Jewish state; therefore it will arise." In 1995, one might ask
a similar question: Does today's world need a Palestinian state and will it
therefore also arise?!
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APPENDIX

The following system of Arabic transliteration has been adopted:
Arabic Letter

Transliteration

-

Arabic Letter
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Transliteration
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m
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Arabic Letter

Transliteration

u

Arabic Letter

Transliteration

n

y

ah/at

t

w
Short vowels (represented by orthographical signs placed above or below
Arabic letters) are transliterated as follows:
short vowels
(above) example ba=
(above) example bu=
(below) example bi=
long vowels

1

JJ

...

/

u•

J•

Transliteration

a

u
i
Transliteration

a
t1

/

e;
dipthongs

i
Transliteration

_),

aw
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uww

